Patriotic War of 1812 the beginning of the war. Mozhaisk deanery. Foreign campaign of the Russian army

Research by Archpriest Alexander Ilyashenko “Dynamics of numbers and losses of the Napoleonic army in the Patriotic War of 1812.”

2012 marked two hundred years Patriotic War of 1812 And Battle of Borodino. These events are described by many contemporaries and historians. However, despite many published sources, memoirs and historical studies, there is no established point of view either for the size of the Russian army and its losses in the Battle of Borodino, or for the size and losses of the Napoleonic army. The spread of values ​​is significant both in the number of armies and in the magnitude of losses.

In the “Military Encyclopedic Lexicon” published in St. Petersburg in 1838 and in the inscription on the Main Monument erected on the Borodino Field in 1838, it is recorded that under Borodino there were 185 thousand Napoleonic soldiers and officers against 120 thousand Russians. The monument also indicates that the losses of the Napoleonic army amounted to 60 thousand, the losses of the Russian army - 45 thousand people (according to modern data - 58 and 44 thousand, respectively).

Along with these estimates, there are others that differ radically from them.

Thus, in Bulletin No. 18 of the “Great” Army, issued immediately after the Battle of Borodino, the Emperor of France estimated French losses at only 10 thousand soldiers and officers.

The spread of estimates is clearly demonstrated by the following data.

Table 1. Estimates of opposing forces made at different times by different authors
Estimates of the sizes of opposing forces made at different times by different historians

Tab. 1

A similar picture is observed for the losses of the Napoleonic army. In the table below, the losses of the Napoleonic army are presented in ascending order.

Table 2. Losses of the Napoleonic army, according to historians and participants in the battle

Tab. 2

As we can see, indeed, the spread of values ​​is quite large and amounts to several tens of thousands of people. In Table 1, the data of the authors who considered the size of the Russian army to be superior to the size of Napoleonic's is highlighted in bold. It is interesting to note that domestic historians have joined this point of view only since 1988, i.e. since the beginning of perestroika.

The most widely used figure for the size of the Napoleonic army was 130,000, for the Russian - 120,000 people, for losses, respectively - 30,000 and 44,000.

As P.N. points out. Grunberg, starting with the work of General M.I. Bogdanovich “History of the Patriotic War of 1812 according to reliable sources,” is recognized for the reliable number of troops of the Great Army under Borodino, proposed back in the 1820s. J. de Chambray and J. Pele de Clozeau. They relied on the roll call data in Gzhatsk on September 2, 1812, but ignored the arrival of reserve units and artillery that replenished Napoleon’s army before the battle.

Many modern historians reject the data indicated on the monument, and some researchers even find it ironic. Thus, A. Vasiliev in the article “Losses of the French army at Borodino” writes that “unfortunately, in our literature about the Patriotic War of 1812 the figure 58,478 people is very often found. It was calculated by the Russian military historian V. A. Afanasyev based on data published in 1813 by order of Rostopchin. The calculations are based on information from the Swiss adventurer Alexander Schmidt, who in October 1812 defected to the Russians and pretended to be a major, allegedly serving in the personal office of Marshal Berthier.” One cannot agree with this opinion: “General Count Toll, based on official documents captured from the enemy during his flight from Russia, believes that there are 185,000 people in the French army, and up to 1,000 artillery pieces.”

The command of the Russian army had the opportunity to rely not only on “official documents captured from the enemy during his flight from Russia,” but also on information from captured enemy generals and officers. For example, General Bonamy was captured in the Battle of Borodino. English General Robert Wilson, who was attached to the Russian army, wrote on December 30, 1812: “Among our prisoners there are at least fifty generals. Their names have been published and will undoubtedly appear in English newspapers."

These generals, as well as the captured General Staff officers, had reliable information. It can be assumed that it was on the basis of numerous documents and testimonies of captured generals and officers that, in hot pursuit, domestic military historians restored the true picture of events.

Based on the facts available to us and their numerical analysis, we tried to estimate the number of troops that Napoleon brought to the Borodino field and the losses of his army in the Battle of Borodino.

Table 3 shows the strength of both armies at the Battle of Borodino according to the widely held view. Modern domestic historians estimate the losses of the Russian army at 44 thousand soldiers and officers.

Table 3. Number of troops in the Battle of Borodino

Tab. 3

At the end of the battle, each army had reserves that did not take a direct part in it. The number of troops of both armies directly participating in the battle, equal to the difference in the total number of troops and the size of the reserves, practically coincides; in terms of artillery, the Napoleonic army was inferior to the Russian one. The losses of the Russian army are one and a half times higher than the losses of Napoleonic.

If the proposed picture corresponds to reality, then what is Borodin’s day famous for? Yes, of course, our soldiers fought bravely, but the enemy’s were braver, ours were more skillful, but they were more skillful, our commanders were experienced, and theirs were more experienced. So which army deserves more admiration? Given this balance of power, the impartial answer is obvious. If we remain impartial, we also have to admit that Napoleon won another victory.

True, there is some confusion. Of the 1,372 guns that were with the army that crossed the border, approximately a quarter were distributed to auxiliary areas. Well, of the remaining more than 1,000 guns, only a little more than half were delivered to the Borodino field?

How could Napoleon, who from a young age deeply understood the importance of artillery, allow not all the guns, but only a certain part, to be deployed for the decisive battle? It seems absurd to accuse Napoleon of unusual carelessness or inability to ensure the transportation of guns to the battlefield. The question is, does the proposed picture correspond to reality and is it possible to put up with such absurdities?

Such puzzling questions are dispelled by data taken from the Monument erected on the Borodino Field.

Table 4. The number of troops in the Battle of Borodino. Monument

Tab. 4

With such a balance of forces, a completely different picture emerges. Despite the glory of the great commander, Napoleon, having one and a half superiority in forces, not only failed to crush the Russian army, but his army suffered 14,000 more losses than the Russian one. The day on which the Russian army endured the onslaught of superior enemy forces and was able to inflict losses on him that were heavier than its own is undoubtedly the day of glory of the Russian army, the day of valor, honor, and courage of its commanders, officers and soldiers.

In our opinion, the problem is of a fundamental nature. Or, using Smerdyakov’s phraseology, in the Battle of Borodino, the “smart” nation defeated the “stupid” one, or the numerous forces of Europe united by Napoleon turned out to be powerless before the greatness of spirit, courage and military art of the Russian Christ-loving army.

To better imagine the course of the war, we present data characterizing its end. The outstanding German military theorist and historian Carl Clausewitz (1780-1831), an officer of the Prussian army who served in the Russian army in the War of 1812, described these events in the book “The March to Russia of 1812,” published in 1830 shortly before his death.

Based on Chambray, Clausewitz estimates the total number of Napoleonic armed forces that crossed the border into Russia during the campaign at 610,000.

When the remnants of the French army gathered in January 1813 across the Vistula, “they were found to number 23,000 men. The Austrian and Prussian troops returning from the campaign numbered approximately 35,000, making the total number of 58,000. Meanwhile, the created army, including the troops that subsequently arrived, actually numbered 610,000 people.

Thus, 552,000 people remained killed and captured in Russia. The army had 182,000 horses. Of these, counting the Prussian and Austrian troops and the troops of MacDonald and Rainier, 15,000 survived, therefore 167,000 were lost. The army had 1,372 guns; The Austrians, Prussians, Macdonald and Rainier brought back up to 150 guns with them, therefore, over 1,200 guns were lost.”

Let us summarize the data given by Clausewitz in a table.

Table 5. Total losses of the “Great” Army in the War of 1812

Tab. 5

Only 10% of the personnel and equipment of the army, which proudly called itself “Great,” returned back. History does not know anything like this: an army more than twice as large as its enemy was completely defeated and almost completely destroyed.

Emperor

Before proceeding directly to further research, let us touch upon the personality of the Russian Emperor Alexander I, who was subjected to a completely undeserved distortion.

The former French ambassador to Russia, Armand de Caulaincourt, a man close to Napoleon, who moved in the highest political spheres of the then Europe, recalls that on the eve of the war, in a conversation with him, the Austrian Emperor Franz said that Emperor Alexander

“they characterized him as an indecisive, suspicious and susceptible to influence sovereign; Meanwhile, in matters that could entail such enormous consequences, one must rely only on oneself and, in particular, not start a war before all means of preserving peace have been exhausted.”

That is, the Austrian emperor, who betrayed the alliance with Russia, considered the Russian emperor soft-hearted and dependent.

Many people remember the words from their school years:

The ruler is weak and crafty,
The bald dandy, the enemy of labor
He reigned over us then.

This false idea of ​​Emperor Alexander, launched at one time by the political elite of the then Europe, was uncritically accepted by liberal Russian historians, as well as the great Pushkin, and many of his contemporaries and descendants.

The same Caulaincourt preserved de Narbonne’s story, which characterizes Emperor Alexander from a completely different perspective. De Narbonne was sent by Napoleon to Vilna, where Emperor Alexander was staying.

“Emperor Alexander frankly told him from the very beginning:

- I will not draw my sword first. I don't want Europe to hold me responsible for the blood that will be shed in this war. I have been receiving threats for 18 months. French troops are on my borders, 300 leagues from their country. I'm at my place for now. They strengthen and arm the fortresses that almost touch my borders; send troops; inciting the Poles. The emperor enriches his treasury and ruins individual unfortunate subjects. I stated that on principle I did not want to act in the same way. I don't want to take money out of my subjects' pockets to put it in my own pocket.

300 thousand French are preparing to cross my borders, and I still respect the alliance and remain faithful to all my obligations. When I change course, I will do so openly.

He (Napoleon - author) has just called Austria, Prussia and all of Europe to arms against Russia, and I am still loyal to the alliance - to such an extent my reason refuses to believe that he wants to sacrifice real benefits to the chances of this war. I have no illusions. I rate his military talents too highly not to take into account all the risks to which the lot of war may expose us; but if I have done everything to preserve an honorable peace and a political system that can lead to universal peace, then I will do nothing inconsistent with the honor of the nation over which I rule. The Russian people are not one of those who retreat in the face of danger.

If all the bayonets of Europe gather on my borders, they will not force me to speak a different language. If I was patient and restrained, it was not due to weakness, but because it is the duty of a sovereign not to listen to the voices of discontent and to have in mind only the peace and interests of his people when it comes to such large issues, and when he hopes to avoid a struggle that might cost so many victims.

Emperor Alexander told de Narbonne that at the moment he had not yet accepted any obligation contrary to the alliance, that he was confident in his rightness and in the justice of his cause and would defend himself if attacked. In conclusion, he opened a map of Russia in front of him and said, pointing to the distant outskirts:

– If Emperor Napoleon decides to go to war and fate is not favorable to our just cause, then he will have to go to the very end to achieve peace.

Then he repeated once again that he would not be the first to draw the sword, but he would be the last to sheathe it.”

Thus, Emperor Alexander, a few weeks before the start of hostilities, knew that war was being prepared, that the invasion army already numbered 300 thousand people, he pursued a firm policy, guided by the honor of the nation that he ruled, knowing that “the Russian people are not those who retreat before danger." In addition, we note that the war with Napoleon is a war not only with France, but with a united Europe, since Napoleon “called Austria, Prussia and all of Europe to arms against Russia.”

There was no talk of any “treachery” or surprise. The leadership of the Russian Empire and the army command had extensive information about the enemy. On the contrary, Caulaincourt emphasizes that

“Prince Ekmulsky, the general staff and everyone else complained that they had not yet been able to obtain any information, and not a single intelligence officer had yet returned from that shore. There, on the other bank, only a few Cossack patrols were visible. The emperor reviewed the troops during the day and once again began reconnaissance of the surrounding area. The corps of our right flank knew no more about the movements of the enemy than we did. There was no information about the Russian position. Everyone complained that none of the spies were returning, which greatly irritated the emperor.”

The situation did not change with the outbreak of hostilities.

“The Neapolitan king, who commanded the vanguard, often made day marches of 10 and 12 leagues. People did not leave their saddles from three o'clock in the morning until 10 o'clock in the evening. The sun, which almost never left the sky, made the emperor forget that a day has only 24 hours. The vanguard was reinforced by carabinieri and cuirassiers; the horses, like the people, were exhausted; we lost a lot of horses; the roads were covered with horse corpses, but the emperor every day, every moment cherished the dream of overtaking the enemy. He wanted to get prisoners at any cost; this was the only way to obtain any information about the Russian army, since it could not be obtained through spies, who immediately ceased to bring us any benefit as soon as we found ourselves in Russia. The prospect of the whip and Siberia froze the ardor of the most skillful and most fearless of them; Added to this was the real difficulty of penetrating the country, and especially the army. Information was received only through Vilna. Nothing came through the direct route. Our marches were too long and too fast, and our too exhausted cavalry could not send out reconnaissance detachments or even flank patrols. Thus, the emperor most often did not know what was happening two leagues away from him. But no matter what price was attached to the capture of prisoners, it was not possible to capture them. The Cossacks' outpost was better than ours; their horses, which were better cared for than ours, turned out to be more resilient during the attack; the Cossacks attacked only when the opportunity presented itself and never got involved in battle.

At the end of the day, our horses were usually so tired that the most insignificant collision cost us several brave men, as their horses lagged behind. When our squadrons retreated, one could observe how the soldiers dismounted in the midst of the battle and pulled their horses behind them, while others were even forced to abandon their horses and flee on foot. Like everyone else, he (the emperor - author) was surprised by this retreat of the 100,000-strong army, in which not a single straggler or cart remained. For 10 leagues around it was impossible to find any horse for a guide. We had to put guides on our horses; often it was not even possible to find a person who would serve as a guide for the emperor. It happened that the same guide led us for three or four days in a row and, in the end, found himself in an area that he knew no better than us.”

While the Napoleonic army followed the Russian one, not being able to obtain even the most insignificant information about its movements, M. I. Kutuzov was appointed commander-in-chief of the army. On August 29, he “arrived at the army in Tsarevo-Zaimishche, between Gzhatsk and Vyazma, and Emperor Napoleon did not yet know about it.”

This testimony of de Caulaincourt is, in our opinion, a special praise for the unity of the Russian people, so amazing that no intelligence or enemy espionage was possible!

Now we will try to trace the dynamics of the processes that led to such an unprecedented defeat. The campaign of 1812 naturally falls into two parts: the offensive and the retreat of the French. We will only consider the first part.

According to Clausewitz, "The war is being waged in five separate theaters of war: two on the left of the road leading from Vilna to Moscow constitute the left wing, two on the right constitute the right wing, and the fifth is the huge center itself." Clausewitz further writes that:

1. Napoleonic Marshal MacDonald on the lower reaches of the Dvina with an army of 30,000 oversees the Riga garrison of 10,000 people.

2. Along the middle course of the Dvina (in the Polotsk region) first Oudinot stands with 40,000 people, and later Oudinot and Saint-Cyr with 62,000 against the Russian general Wittgenstein, whose forces first reached 15,000 people, and later 50,000.

3. In southern Lithuania, the front to the Pripyat swamps was Schwarzenberg and Rainier with 51,000 people against General Tormasov, who was later joined by Admiral Chichagov with the Moldavian army, a total of 35,000 people.

4. General Dombrovsky with his division and a small cavalry, only 10,000 people, watches Bobruisk and General Hertel, who is forming a reserve corps of 12,000 people near the city of Mozyr.

5. Finally, in the middle are the main forces of the French, numbering 300,000 people, against the two main Russian armies - Barclay and Bagration - with a force of 120,000 people; these French forces are directed towards Moscow to conquer it.

Let us summarize the data given by Clausewitz into a table and add the column “Correlation of Forces”.

Table 6. Distribution of forces by direction

Tab. 6

Having in the center more than 300,000 soldiers against 120,000 Russian regular troops (Cossack regiments are not classified as regular troops), that is, having a superiority of 185,000 people at the initial stage of the war, Napoleon sought to defeat the Russian army in a general battle. The deeper he penetrated into Russian territory, the more acute this need became. But the persecution of the Russian Army, exhausting for the center of the “Great” Army, contributed to an intensive reduction in its numbers.

The ferocity of the Borodino battle, its bloodshed, as well as the scale of losses can be judged from a fact that cannot be ignored. Domestic historians, in particular, employees of the museum on the Borodino field, estimate the number of people buried on the field at 48-50 thousand people. And in total, according to military historian General A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 58,521 bodies were buried or burned on the Borodino field. We can assume that the number of buried or burned bodies is equal to the number of soldiers and officers of both armies who died and died from wounds in the Battle of Borodino.

The losses of the Napoleonic army in the Battle of Borodino were widely reported by the data of the French officer Denier, who served as an inspector at Napoleon’s General Staff, presented in Table 7:

Table 7. Losses of the Napoleonic army.

Tab. 7

Denier data, rounded to 30 thousand, is currently considered the most reliable. Thus, if we accept that Denier’s data is correct, then the only casualties of the Russian army will be those killed

58,521 - 6,569 = 51,952 soldiers and officers.

This value significantly exceeds the loss of the Russian army, equal, as indicated above, to 44 thousand, including killed, wounded, and prisoners.

Denier's data is also questionable for the following reasons.

The total losses of both armies at Borodino amounted to 74 thousand, including a thousand prisoners on each side. Let us subtract the total number of prisoners from this value, and we get 72 thousand killed and wounded. In this case, the share of both armies will be only

72,000 – 58,500 = 13,500 wounded,

This means that the ratio between wounded and killed will be

13 500: 58 500 = 10: 43.

Such a small number of wounded in relation to the number of killed seems completely implausible.

We are faced with obvious contradictions with the available facts. The losses of the “Great” Army in the Battle of Borodino, equal to 30,000 people, are obviously underestimated. We cannot consider such a magnitude of losses realistic.

We will assume that the losses of the “Great” Army are 58,000 people. Let's estimate the number of killed and wounded in each army.

According to Table 5, which shows Denier’s data, in the Napoleonic army 6,569 were killed, 21,517 were wounded, and 1,176 officers and soldiers were captured (the number of prisoners is rounded to 1,000). About a thousand Russian soldiers were also captured. Let us subtract the number of those captured from the number of losses of each army, and we get 43,000 and 57,000 people, respectively, for a total of 100 thousand. We will assume that the number of killed is proportional to the amount of losses.

Then, in the Napoleonic army died

57,000 · 58,500 / 100,000 = 33,500,

wounded

57 000 – 33 500 = 23 500.

Died in the Russian army

58 500 - 33 500 = 25 000,

wounded

43 000 – 25 000 = 18 000.

Table 8. Losses of the Russian and Napoleonic armies
in the Battle of Borodino.

Tab. 8

We will try to find additional arguments and, with their help, justify the realistic amount of losses of the “Great” Army in the Battle of Borodino.

In further work, we relied on an interesting and very original article by I.P. Artsybashev “Losses of Napoleonic generals on September 5-7, 1812 in the Battle of Borodino.” After conducting a thorough study of the sources, I.P. Artsybashev established that in the Battle of Borodino, not 49, as is commonly believed, but 58 generals were out of action. This result is confirmed by the opinion of A. Vasiliev, who in the above article writes: “The Battle of Borodino was marked by large losses of generals: 26 generals were killed and wounded in the Russian troops, and 50 in the Napoleonic troops (according to incomplete data).

After the battles he fought, Napoleon published bulletins containing information about the size and losses of his and the enemy’s army so far from reality that in France a saying arose: “Lies like a bulletin.”

1. Austerlitz. The Emperor of France acknowledged the loss of the French: 800 killed and 1,600 wounded, for a total of 2,400 men. In fact, French losses amounted to 9,200 soldiers and officers.

2. Eylau, 58th bulletin. Napoleon ordered the publication of data on French losses: 1,900 killed and 4,000 wounded, a total of 5,900 people, while the real losses amounted to 25 thousand soldiers and officers killed and wounded.

3. Wagram. The Emperor agreed to a loss of 1,500 killed and 3,000-4,000 wounded French. Total: 4,500-5,500 soldiers and officers, but in reality 33,900.

4. Smolensk. 13th bulletin of the "Great Army". Losses: 700 French killed and 3,200 wounded. Total: 3,900 people. In fact, French losses amounted to over 12,000 people.

Let's summarize the given data in a table.

Table 9. Napoleon's bulletins

Tab. 9

The average underestimate for these four battles is 4.5, therefore it can be assumed that Napoleon underestimated the losses of his army by more than four times.

“A lie must be monstrous in order to be believed,” the Minister of Propaganda of Nazi Germany, Dr. Goebbels, once said. Looking at the table above, you have to admit that he had famous predecessors, and he had someone to learn from.
Of course, the accuracy of this estimate is not great, but since Napoleon stated that his army at Borodino lost 10,000 people, we can assume that the real losses are approximately 45,000 people. These considerations are of a qualitative nature; we will try to find more accurate estimates on the basis of which quantitative conclusions can be drawn. To do this, we will rely on the ratio of generals and soldiers of Napoleonic army.

Let's look at the well-described battles of the imperial times of 1805-1815, in which the number of Napoleonic generals who were out of action was more than 10.

Table 10. Losses of incapacitated generals and incapacitated soldiers

Tab. 10

On average, for every general who is out of action, there are 958 soldiers and officers who are out of action. This is a random variable, its variance is 86. We will proceed from the fact that in the Battle of Borodino, for every general who was incapacitated, there were 958 ± 86 soldiers and officers who were incapacitated.

958 · 58 = 55,500 people.

The variance of this quantity is equal to

86 · 58 = 5,000.

With a probability of 0.95, the true value of the losses of the Napoleonic army lies in the range from 45,500 to 65,500 people. The loss value of 30-40 thousand lies outside this interval and, therefore, is statistically insignificant and can be discarded. In contrast, the loss value of 58,000 lies within this confidence interval and can be considered significant.

As it moved deeper into the territory of the Russian Empire, the size of the “Great” Army was greatly reduced. Moreover, the main reason for this was not combat losses, but losses caused by the exhaustion of people, the lack of sufficient food, drinking water, hygiene and sanitation products and other conditions necessary to ensure the march of such a large army.

Napoleon's goal was in a rapid campaign, taking advantage of superior forces and his own outstanding military leadership, to defeat the Russian army in a general battle and dictate his terms from a position of strength. Contrary to expectations, it was not possible to force a battle because the Russian army maneuvered so skillfully and set a pace of movement that the “Great” Army could withstand with great difficulty, experiencing hardships and needing everything it needed.

The principle of “war feeds itself,” which had proven itself well in Europe, turned out to be practically inapplicable in Russia with its distances, forests, swamps and, most importantly, a rebellious population that did not want to feed the enemy army. But Napoleonic soldiers suffered not only from hunger, but also from thirst. This circumstance did not depend on the wishes of the surrounding peasants, but was an objective factor.

Firstly, unlike Europe, in Russia settlements are quite far from each other. Secondly, they have as many wells as are necessary to meet the drinking water needs of the residents, but are completely insufficient for the many passing soldiers. Thirdly, the Russian army was ahead, whose soldiers drank these wells “to the point of mud,” as he writes in the novel “War and Peace.”

The lack of water also led to the unsatisfactory sanitary condition of the army. This entailed fatigue and exhaustion of the soldiers, caused their illnesses, as well as the death of horses. All this taken together entailed significant non-combat losses of the Napoleonic army.
We will consider the change over time in the size of the center of the “Great” Army. The table below uses Clausewitz's data on changes in army size.

Table 11. Number of “Great” Army

Tab. eleven

In the “Numbers” column of this table, based on Clausewitz’s data, the number of soldiers of the center of the “Great” Army on the border is presented, on the 52nd day near Smolensk, on the 75th near Borodin and on the 83rd at the time of entry into Moscow. To ensure the safety of the army, as Clausewitz notes, detachments were allocated to guard communications, flanks, etc. The number of soldiers in the ranks is the sum of the two previous values. As we see from the table, on the way from the border to the Borodino field, the “Great” Army lost

301,000 – 157,000 = 144,000 people,

that is, slightly less than 50% of its initial strength.

After the Battle of Borodino, the Russian army retreated, the Napoleonic army continued the pursuit. The fourth corps under the command of the Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais moved through Ruza to Zvenigorod in order to enter the retreat route of the Russian army, delay it and force it to accept a battle with Napoleon’s main forces in unfavorable conditions. The detachment of Major General F.F. sent to Zvenigorod. Winzengerode detained the viceroy's corps for six hours. Russian troops occupied a hill, resting their right flank on a ravine and their left flank on a swamp. The slope facing the enemy was a plowed field. Natural obstacles on the flanks, as well as loose soil, hampered the maneuver of enemy infantry and cavalry. The well-chosen position allowed the small detachment to “put up vigorous resistance, costing the French several thousand killed and wounded.”

We accepted that in the battle of Crimean the losses of the “Great” Army amounted to four thousand people. The rationale for this choice will be given below.
The column “Hypothetical strength” presents the number of soldiers who would remain in the ranks if there were no combat losses and security detachments would not have been allocated, that is, if the army’s strength had been reduced only due to the difficulties of the march. Then the hypothetical size of the army center should be a smooth, monotonically decreasing curve and it can be approximated by some function n(t).

Let us assume that the rate of change of the approximating function is directly proportional to its current value, that is

dn/dt = - λn.

Then

n(t) = n0 e- λ t ,

where n0 is the initial number of troops, n0 = 301 thousand.

The hypothetical number is related to the real one - this is the sum of the real number with the number of troops allocated for protection, as well as with the amount of losses in battles. But we must take into account that if there were no battles, and the soldiers remained in the ranks, then their number would also decrease over time at the same rate as the size of the entire army. For example, if there were no battles and no guards were allocated, then in Moscow there would be

90 + (12 e- 23 λ + 30) e- 8 λ + 4 + 13 = 144.3 thousand soldiers.

The coefficients for λ are the number of days that have passed since this battle.
The parameter λ is found from the condition

Σ (n(ti) – ni)2= min, (1)

where ni are taken from the “Hypothetical number” line, ti is the number of days in a day from the moment of crossing the border.

Relative losses per day is a value characterizing the intensity of change in the hypothetical number. It is calculated as the logarithm of the ratio of the number at the beginning and end of a given period to the duration of this period. For example, for the first period:

ln(301/195.5) / 52 = 0.00830 1/day

Noteworthy is the high intensity of non-combat losses during the pursuit of the Russian army from the border to Smolensk. On the transition from Smolensk to Borodino, the intensity of losses decreases by 20%, this is obviously due to the fact that the pace of pursuit has decreased. But on the transition from Borodino to Moscow, the intensity, we emphasize, of non-combat losses increases two and a half times. The sources do not mention any epidemics that would cause increased morbidity and mortality. This once again suggests that the magnitude of the losses of the “Great” Army in the Battle of Borodino, which according to Denier is 30 thousand, is underestimated.

Let us again proceed from the fact that the strength of the “Great” Army on the Borodino field was 185 thousand, and its losses were 58 thousand. But at the same time, we are faced with a contradiction: according to Table 9, there were 130 thousand Napoleonic soldiers and officers on the Borodino field. This contradiction, in our opinion, is resolved by the following assumption.

The General Staff of Napoleonic Army recorded the number of soldiers who crossed the border with Napoleon on June 24 according to one statement, and suitable reinforcements according to another. The fact that reinforcements were coming is a fact. In a report to Emperor Alexander dated August 23 (September 4 n.s.), Kutuzov wrote: “Several officers and sixty privates were taken prisoners yesterday. Judging by the numbers of the corps to which these prisoners belong, there is no doubt that the enemy is concentrated. Subsequently, the fifth battalions of French regiments arrive to him.”

According to Clausewitz, “during the campaign, 33,000 more people arrived with Marshal Victor, 27,000 with the divisions of Durutte and Loison, and 80,000 other reinforcements, therefore about 140,000 people.” Marshal Victor and the divisions of Durutte and Loison joined the “Great” Army a long time after it left Moscow and could not participate in the Battle of Borodino.
Of course, the number of reinforcements on the march was also decreasing, so out of the 80 thousand soldiers who crossed the border, Borodin reached

185 - 130 = 55 thousand replenishments.

Then we can claim that on the Borodino field there were 130 thousand soldiers of the “Great” Army itself, as well as 55 thousand reinforcements, the presence of which remained “in the shadows”, and that the total number of Napoleonic troops should be taken equal to 185 thousand people. Let us assume that losses are proportional to the number of troops directly involved in the battle. Provided that 18 thousand remained in the reserve of the “Great” Army, the recorded losses are

58·(130 – 18) / (185 – 18) = 39 thousand.

This value coincides surprisingly well with the data of the French general Segur and a number of other researchers. We will assume that their assessment is more consistent with reality, that is, we will assume that the amount of recorded losses is 40 thousand people. In this case, the “shadow” losses will be

58 - 40 = 18 thousand people.

Consequently, we can assume that double accounting was carried out in the Napoleonic army: some of the soldiers were on one sheet, and some on another. This applies to both the total number of the army and its losses.

With the found value of the taken into account losses, condition (1) is satisfied with the value of the approximation parameter λ equal to 0.00804 1/day and the value of losses in the battle at Krymsky - 4 thousand soldiers and officers. In this case, the approximating function approximates the value of hypothetical losses with a fairly high accuracy of about 2%. This accuracy of approximation indicates the validity of the assumption that the rate of change of the approximating function is directly proportional to its current value.
Using the results obtained, we will create a new table:

Table 12. Number of the center of the “Great” Army

Tab. 12

We now see that the relative losses per day are in fairly good agreement with each other.

With λ = 0.00804 1/day, daily non-combat losses amounted to 2,400 at the beginning of the campaign and slightly more than 800 people per day as Moscow approached.

To be able to take a more detailed look at the Battle of Borodino, we proposed a numerical model of the dynamics of losses of both armies in the Battle of Borodino. A mathematical model provides additional material for analyzing whether a given set of initial conditions corresponds to reality or not, helps to discard extreme points, and also choose the most realistic option.

We assumed that the losses of one army at a given time are directly proportional to the current strength of the other. Of course, we are aware that such a model is very imperfect. It does not take into account the division of the army into infantry, cavalry and artillery, and also does not take into account such important factors as the talent of commanders, the valor and military skill of soldiers and officers, the effectiveness of command and control of troops, their equipment, etc. But, since opponents of approximately equal levels opposed each other, even such an imperfect model will give qualitatively plausible results.

Based on this assumption, we obtain a system of two first-order ordinary linear differential equations:

dx/dt = - py
dy/dt = - qx

The initial conditions are x0 and y0 – the number of armies before the battle and the amount of their losses at time t0 = 0: x’0 = - py0; y’0 = - qx0.

The battle continued until darkness, but the bloodiest actions, which brought the greatest number of losses, continued until the French captured Raevsky’s battery, then the intensity of the battle subsided. Therefore, we will assume that the active phase of the battle lasted ten hours.

By solving this system, we find the dependence of the size of each army on time, and also, knowing the losses of each army, the proportionality coefficients, i.e., the intensity with which the soldiers of one army hit the soldiers of another.

x = x0 cosh (ωt) - p y0 sinh (ωt) / ω
y = y0 cosh (ωt) - q x0 sinh (ωt) / ω,
where ω = (pq)1.

Table 7 below presents data on losses, the number of troops before the start and at the end of the battle, taken from various sources. Data on the intensity, as well as losses in the first and last hour of the battle, were obtained from the mathematical model we proposed.

When analyzing numerical data, we must proceed from the fact that the opponents confronting each other were approximately equal in training, technology and high professional level of both ordinary soldiers and officers and army commanders. But we must also take into account the fact that “Near Borodin it was a matter of whether Russia should be or not. This battle is our own, our native battle. In this sacred lottery we were investors in everything inseparable from our political existence: all our past glory, all our present national honor, national pride, the greatness of the Russian name - all our future destiny.”

During a fierce battle with a numerically superior enemy, the Russian army retreated somewhat, maintaining order, control, artillery and combat effectiveness. The attacking side suffers greater losses than the defending side until it defeats its enemy and he takes flight. But the Russian army did not flinch and did not run.

This circumstance gives us reason to believe that the total losses of the Russian army should be less than the losses of Napoleonic. It is impossible not to take into account such an intangible factor as the spirit of the army, to which the great Russian commanders attached so much importance, and which Leo Tolstoy so subtly noted. It is expressed in valor, perseverance, and the ability to defeat the enemy. We can, of course, conditionally assume that this factor in our model is reflected in the intensity with which warriors of one army hit warriors of another.

Table 13. Number of troops and losses of the parties

Tab. 13

The first line of Table 13 shows the initial strength and casualty figures reported in Napoleon's Grand Army Bulletin No. 18. With this ratio of the initial number and the magnitude of losses, according to our model, it turns out that during the battle the losses of the Russian army would have been 3-4 times higher than the losses of the Napoleonic army, and the Napoleonic soldiers fought 3 times more effectively than the Russians. With such a course of the battle, it would seem that the Russian army should have been defeated, but this did not happen. Therefore, this initial data set is not true and should be rejected.

The next line presents the results based on data from the French professors Lavisse and Rambaud. As our model shows, the losses of the Russian army would be almost three and a half times greater than the losses of Napoleonic. In the last hour of the battle, the Napoleonic army would lose less than 2% of its strength, and the Russian army - more than 12%.

The question is, why did Napoleon stop the battle if the Russian army was soon expected to be defeated? This is contradicted by eyewitness accounts. We present Caulaincourt's testimony about the events that followed the capture of Raevsky's battery by the French, as a result of which the Russian army was forced to retreat.

“A sparse forest covered their passage and hid their movements in this place from us. The emperor hoped that the Russians would speed up their retreat, and hoped to throw his cavalry at them to try to break the line of enemy troops. Units of the Young Guard and the Poles were already moving to approach the fortifications that remained in Russian hands. The emperor, in order to better examine their movements, went forward and walked right up to the very line of riflemen. Bullets whistled around him; he left his retinue behind. The emperor was at this moment in great danger, since the firing became so hot that the Neapolitan king and several generals rushed to persuade and beg the emperor to leave.

The emperor then went to the approaching columns. The old guard followed him; carabinieri and cavalry marched in echelons. The emperor, apparently, decided to capture the last enemy fortifications, but the Prince of Neuchâtel and the King of Naples pointed out to him that these troops did not have a commander, that almost all divisions and many regiments also lost their commanders who were killed or wounded; the number of cavalry and infantry regiments, as the emperor can see, has greatly decreased; the time is already late; the enemy is indeed retreating, but in such an order, maneuvers in such a way and defends the position with such courage, although our artillery crushes his military masses, that one cannot hope for success unless the old guard is allowed to attack; in such a state of affairs, success achieved at this cost would be a failure, and failure would be such a loss that would cross out the gain of the battle; finally, they drew the emperor’s attention to the fact that they should not risk the only corps that still remained intact, and should save it for other occasions. The Emperor hesitated. He rode forward again to observe the enemy’s movements himself.”

The emperor “made sure that the Russians were taking up positions, and that many corps not only did not retreat, but were concentrating together and, apparently, were going to cover the retreat of the remaining troops. All the reports that followed one after another said that our losses were very significant. The Emperor made a decision. He canceled the order to attack and limited himself to an order to support the corps still fighting in case the enemy tried to do something, which was unlikely, because he also suffered enormous losses. The battle ended only at nightfall. Both sides were so tired that at many points the shooting stopped without a command.”

The third line contains the data of General Mikhnevich. The very high level of losses of the Russian army is striking. No army, not even a Russian one, can withstand the loss of more than half of its initial strength. In addition, estimates by modern researchers agree that the Russian army lost 44 thousand people in the battle. Therefore, these initial data do not seem to correspond to reality and should be discarded.

Let's look at the data in the fourth row. With such a balance of forces, our proposed model shows that Napoleonic army fought extremely effectively and inflicted heavy losses on its enemy. Our model allows us to consider some possible situations. If the number of armies were the same, then with the same efficiency, the number of the Russian army would be reduced by 40%, and the Napoleonic army by 20%. But the facts contradict such assumptions. In the battle of Maloyaroslavets, the forces were equal, and for the Napoleonic army it was not about victory, but about life. However, Napoleon's army was forced to retreat and return to the devastated Smolensk road, dooming itself to hunger and hardship. In addition, we showed above that the amount of losses equal to 30 thousand is underestimated, therefore Vasiliev’s data should be excluded from consideration.

According to the data given in the fifth line, the relative losses of the Napoleonic army, amounting to 43%, exceed the relative losses of the Russian army, equal to 37%. It cannot be expected that European soldiers, who fought for winter quarters and the opportunity to profit from the plunder of a defeated country, could withstand such high relative losses, exceeding the relative losses of the Russian army, which fought for its Fatherland and defended the Orthodox Faith from the atheists. Therefore, although these data are based on the ideas of modern domestic scientists, nevertheless, they seem unacceptable to us.

Let's move on to consider the data in the sixth line: the strength of the Napoleonic army is assumed to be 185 thousand, the Russian army - 120 thousand, losses - 58 and 44 thousand people. According to the model we have proposed, the losses of the Russian army throughout the battle are somewhat lower than the losses of the Napoleonic army. Let us pay attention to an important detail. The efficiency with which Russian soldiers fought was twice that of their opponents! The late veteran of the Great Patriotic War, when asked: “What is war?”, answered: “War is work, hard, dangerous work, and it must be done faster and better than the enemy.” This is quite consistent with the words of the famous poem by M.Yu. Lermontov:

The enemy experienced a lot that day,
What does Russian fighting mean?
Our hand-to-hand combat!

This gives us reason to understand why Napoleon did not send the guard into the fire. The valiant Russian army fought more effectively than its enemy and, despite the inequality of forces, inflicted heavier losses on him. It is also impossible not to take into account the fact that the losses in the last hour of the battle were almost identical. Under such conditions, Napoleon could not count on the defeat of the Russian army, just as he could not exhaust the strength of his army in what had become a futile battle. The results of the analysis allow us to accept the data presented in the sixth row of Table 13.

So, the number of the Russian army was 120 thousand people, the Napoleonic army was 185 thousand, respectively, the losses of the Russian army were 44 thousand, the Napoleonic army was 58 thousand.

Now we can create the final table.

Table 14. Number and losses of the Russian and Napoleonic armies
in the Battle of Borodino.

Tab. 14

The valor, selflessness, and military skill of the Russian generals, officers and soldiers, who inflicted huge losses on the “Great” Army, forced Napoleon to abandon the decision to introduce his last reserve - the Guards Corps - at the end of the battle, since even the Guard might not achieve decisive success. He did not expect to meet such exceptionally skillful and fierce resistance from Russian soldiers, because

And we promised to die
And they kept the oath of allegiance
We are at the Battle of Borodino.

At the end of the battle, M.I. Kutuzov wrote to Alexander I: “This day will remain an eternal monument to the courage and excellent courage of the Russian soldiers, where all the infantry, cavalry and artillery fought desperately. Everyone’s desire was to die on the spot and not yield to the enemy. The French army, led by Napoleon himself, being in superior strength, did not overcome the fortitude of the Russian soldier, who cheerfully sacrificed his life for his fatherland.”

Everyone cheerfully sacrificed their lives for their fatherland, from soldiers to generals.

“Confirm in all companies,” artillery chief Kutaisov wrote to Borodin the day before, “that they do not move from their positions until the enemy sits astride the guns. To tell the commanders and all gentlemen officers that only by courageously holding on to the closest shot of grapeshot can we ensure that the enemy does not yield a single step of our position.

Artillery must sacrifice itself. Let them take you with the guns, but fire the last canister shot at point-blank range... Even if the battery had been taken after all this, although one can almost guarantee otherwise, then it would have already fully atoned for the loss of the guns...”

It should be noted that these were not empty words: General Kutaisov himself died in the battle, and the French were able to capture only a dozen guns.

Napoleon's task in the Battle of Borodino, as well as at the stage of pursuit, was the complete defeat of the Russian army, its destruction. To defeat an enemy of approximately equal military skill, a large numerical superiority is required. Napoleon concentrated 300 thousand in the main direction against the Russian army of 120 thousand. Possessing a superiority of 180 thousand at the initial stage, Napoleon was unable to maintain it. “With more care and better organization of the food supply, with a more deliberate organization of marches, in which huge masses of troops would not be uselessly piled up on one road, he could have prevented the famine that reigned in his army from the very beginning of the campaign, and thereby preserving it in a more complete composition.”

Huge non-combat losses, indicating a disregard for his own soldiers, who for Napoleon were just “cannon fodder,” were the reason that in the Battle of Borodino, although he had one and a half superiority, he lacked one or two corps to deliver a decisive blow . Napoleon was unable to achieve his main goal - the defeat and destruction of the Russian army, either at the stage of pursuit or in the Battle of Borodino. The failure to complete the tasks facing Napoleon is an indisputable achievement of the Russian army, which, thanks to the skill of command, courage and valor of officers and soldiers, snatched success from the enemy in the first stage of the war, which was the reason for his heavy defeat and complete defeat.

“Of all my battles, the most terrible is the one I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians acquired the right to be invincible,” Napoleon later wrote.

As for the Russian army, during the most difficult, brilliantly executed strategic retreat, in which not a single rearguard battle was lost, it retained its strength. The tasks that Kutuzov set for himself in the Battle of Borodino - to preserve his army, to bleed and exhaust Napoleon's army - were equally brilliantly accomplished.

On the Borodino field, the Russian army withstood the army of Europe united by Napoleon, one and a half times larger in number, and inflicted significant losses on its enemy. Yes, indeed, the battle near Moscow was “the most terrible” of those that Napoleon fought, and he himself admitted that “the Russians have acquired the right to be invincible.” One cannot but agree with this assessment of the Emperor of France.

Notes:

1 Military encyclopedic lexicon. Part two. St. Petersburg 1838. pp. 435-445.
2 P.A. Zhilin. M. Science. 1988, p. 170.
3 Battle of Borodino from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. We have corrected errors in the 4th and 15th lines, in which the compilers rearranged the numbers of the Russian and Napoleonic armies.
4 Artsybashev I.P. Losses of Napoleonic generals on September 5-7, 1812 in the Battle of Borodino.
5 Grunberg P.N. On the size of the Great Army in the Battle of Borodino // The era of the Napoleonic wars: people, events, ideas. Materials of the V All-Russian Scientific Conference. Moscow April 25, 2002 M. 2002. P. 45-71.
6A. Vasiliev. “Losses of the French army at Borodino” “Motherland”, No. 6/7, 1992. P.68-71.
7 Military encyclopedic lexicon. Part two. St. Petersburg 1838. P. 438
8 Robert Wilson. “Diary of travel, service and social events during his time with the European armies during the campaigns of 1812-1813. St. Petersburg 1995 p. 108.
9 According to Chambray, from whom we generally borrowed data on the size of the French armed forces, we determined the size of the French army at its entry into Russia at 440,000 people. During the campaign, 33,000 more people arrived with Marshal Victor, 27,000 with the divisions of Durutte and Loison, and 80,000 other reinforcements, therefore, about 140,000 people. The rest consists of the convoy parts. (Note by Clausewitz). Clausewitz. Campaign in Russia in 1812. Moscow. 1997, p. 153.
10 Clausewitz. Campaign in Russia in 1812. Moscow. 1997, p. 153.
11 Armand de Caulaincourt. Memoirs. Smolensk 1991. P.69.
12 Armand de Caulaincourt. Memoirs. Smolensk 1991. P. 70.
13 Armand de Caulaincourt. Memoirs. Smolensk 1991. P. 77.
14 Armand de Caulaincourt. Memoirs. Smolensk 1991. pp. 177,178.
15 Armand de Caulaincourt. Memoirs. Smolensk 1991. P. 178.
16 Clausewitz. 1812 Moscow. 1997, p. 127.
17 “Motherland”, No. 2, 2005.
18 http://ukus.com.ua/ukus/works/view/63
19 Clausewitz. Campaign in Russia in 1812. Moscow. 1997 p. 137-138.
20 M.I. Kutuzov. Letters, notes. Moscow. 1989 p. 320.
21 Denis Davydov. Library for reading, 1835, vol. 12.
22 E. Lavisse, A. Rambo, “History of the 19th century,” M. 1938, vol. 2, p. 265
23 “Patriotic War and Russian Society.” Volume IV.
24 A. Vasiliev. “Losses of the French army at Borodino” “Motherland”, No. 6/7, 1992. P.68-71.
25 P.A. Zhilin. M. Science. 1988, p. 170.
26 Armand de Caulaincourt. Memoirs. Smolensk 1991. pp. 128,129.
27 M.I. Kutuzov. Letters, notes. Moscow. 1989 p. 336
28 M. Bragin. Kutuzov. ZhZL. M. 1995. p. 116.
29 Clausewitz. 1812 Moscow. 1997, p. 122.

Beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812

2012 marks the 200th anniversary of the military-historical patriotic event - the Patriotic War of 1812, which is of great importance for the political, social, cultural and military development of Russia.

Beginning of the war

June 12, 1812 (old style) Napoleon's French army, having crossed the Neman near the city of Kovno (now Kaunas in Lithuania), invaded the Russian Empire. This day is listed in history as the beginning of the war between Russia and France.

In this war, two forces collided. On the one hand, Napoleon’s army of half a million (about 640 thousand people), which consisted only half of the French and also included representatives of almost all of Europe. An army, intoxicated by numerous victories, led by famous marshals and generals led by Napoleon. The strengths of the French army were its large numbers, good material and technical support, combat experience, and belief in the invincibility of the army.

She was opposed by the Russian army, which at the beginning of the war represented one-third of the French army. Before the start of the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian-Turkish War of 1806-1812 had just ended. The Russian army was divided into three groups far apart from each other (under the command of generals M.B. Barclay de Tolly, P.I. Bagration and A.P. Tormasov). Alexander I was at the headquarters of Barclay's army.

The blow of Napoleon's army was taken by the troops stationed on the western border: the 1st Army of Barclay de Tolly and the 2nd Army of Bagration (153 thousand soldiers in total).

Knowing his numerical superiority, Napoleon pinned his hopes on a lightning war. One of his main mistakes was to underestimate the patriotic impulse of the army and people of Russia.

The start of the war was successful for Napoleon. At 6 o'clock in the morning on June 12 (24), 1812, the vanguard of the French troops entered the Russian city of Kovno. The crossing of 220 thousand soldiers of the Great Army near Kovno took 4 days. 5 days later, another group (79 thousand soldiers) under the command of the Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais crossed the Neman to the south of Kovno. At the same time, even further south, near Grodno, the Neman was crossed by 4 corps (78-79 thousand soldiers) under the overall command of the King of Westphalia, Jerome Bonaparte. In the northern direction near Tilsit, the Neman crossed the 10th Corps of Marshal MacDonald (32 thousand soldiers), which was aimed at St. Petersburg. In the southern direction, from Warsaw across the Bug, a separate Austrian corps of General Schwarzenberg (30-33 thousand soldiers) began to invade.

The rapid advance of the powerful French army forced the Russian command to retreat deeper into the country. The commander of the Russian troops, Barclay de Tolly, avoided a general battle, preserving the army and striving to unite with Bagration’s army. The numerical superiority of the enemy raised the question of urgent replenishment of the army. But in Russia there was no universal conscription. The army was recruited through conscription. And Alexander I decided to take an unusual step. On July 6, he issued a manifesto calling for the creation of a people's militia. This is how the first partisan detachments began to appear. This war united all segments of the population. As now, so then, the Russian people are united only by misfortune, grief, and tragedy. It didn’t matter who you were in society, what your income was. The Russian people fought unitedly to defend the freedom of their homeland. All people became a single force, which is why the name “Patriotic War” was determined. The war became an example of the fact that the Russian people will never allow freedom and spirit to be enslaved; he will defend his honor and name to the end.

The armies of Barclay and Bagration met near Smolensk at the end of July, thus achieving their first strategic success.

Battle for Smolensk

By August 16 (new style), Napoleon approached Smolensk with 180 thousand soldiers. After the unification of the Russian armies, the generals began to persistently demand from the commander-in-chief Barclay de Tolly a general battle. At 6 am August 16 Napoleon began the assault on the city.

In the battles near Smolensk, the Russian army showed the greatest resilience. The battle for Smolensk marked the development of a nationwide war between the Russian people and the enemy. Napoleon's hope for a lightning war was dashed.

Battle for Smolensk. Adam, around 1820

The stubborn battle for Smolensk lasted 2 days, until the morning of August 18, when Barclay de Tolly withdrew his troops from the burning city to avoid a big battle without a chance of victory. Barclay had 76 thousand, another 34 thousand (Bagration’s army). After the capture of Smolensk, Napoleon moved towards Moscow.

Meanwhile, the protracted retreat caused public discontent and protest among most of the army (especially after the surrender of Smolensk), so on August 20 (according to modern style) Emperor Alexander I signed a decree appointing M.I. as commander-in-chief of the Russian troops. Kutuzova. At that time, Kutuzov was 67 years old. A commander of the Suvorov school, with half a century of military experience, he enjoyed universal respect both in the army and among the people. However, he also had to retreat in order to gain time to gather all his forces.

Kutuzov could not avoid a general battle for political and moral reasons. By September 3 (new style), the Russian army retreated to the village of Borodino. Further retreat meant the surrender of Moscow. By that time, Napoleon's army had already suffered significant losses, and the difference in numbers between the two armies had narrowed. In this situation, Kutuzov decided to give a general battle.

West of Mozhaisk, 125 km from Moscow near the village of Borodina August 26 (September 7, new style) 1812 A battle took place that will forever go down in the history of our people. - the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 between the Russian and French armies.

The Russian army numbered 132 thousand people (including 21 thousand poorly armed militias). The French army, hot on her heels, numbered 135 thousand. Kutuzov's headquarters, believing that there were about 190 thousand people in the enemy army, chose a defensive plan. In fact, the battle was an assault by French troops on a line of Russian fortifications (flashes, redoubts and lunettes).

Napoleon hoped to defeat the Russian army. But the resilience of the Russian troops, where every soldier, officer, and general was a hero, overturned all the calculations of the French commander. The battle lasted all day. The losses were huge on both sides. The Battle of Borodino is one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century. According to the most conservative estimates of total losses, 2,500 people died on the field every hour. Some divisions lost up to 80% of their strength. There were almost no prisoners on either side. French losses amounted to 58 thousand people, Russians - 45 thousand.

Emperor Napoleon later recalled: “Of all my battles, the most terrible was the one I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of winning, and the Russians showed themselves worthy of being called invincible.”

Cavalry battle

On September 8 (21), Kutuzov ordered a retreat to Mozhaisk with the firm intention of preserving the army. The Russian army retreated, but retained its combat effectiveness. Napoleon failed to achieve the main thing - the defeat of the Russian army.

September 13 (26) in the village of Fili Kutuzov had a meeting about the future plan of action. After the military council in Fili, the Russian army, by decision of Kutuzov, was withdrawn from Moscow. “With the loss of Moscow, Russia is not yet lost, but with the loss of the army, Russia is lost”. These words of the great commander, which went down in history, were confirmed by subsequent events.

A.K. Savrasov. The hut in which the famous council in Fili took place

Military Council in Fili (A. D. Kivshenko, 1880)

Capture of Moscow

In the evening September 14 (September 27, new style) Napoleon entered empty Moscow without a fight. In the war against Russia, all of Napoleon’s plans consistently collapsed. Expecting to receive the keys to Moscow, he stood in vain for several hours on Poklonnaya Hill, and when he entered the city, he was greeted by deserted streets.

Fire in Moscow on September 15-18, 1812 after the capture of the city by Napoleon. Painting by A.F. Smirnova, 1813

Already on the night of September 14 (27) to September 15 (28), the city was engulfed in fire, which by the night of September 15 (28) to September 16 (29) intensified so much that Napoleon was forced to leave the Kremlin.

About 400 lower-class townspeople were shot on suspicion of arson. The fire raged until September 18 and destroyed most of Moscow. Of the 30 thousand houses that were in Moscow before the invasion, “hardly 5 thousand” remained after Napoleon left the city.

While Napoleon's army was inactive in Moscow, losing its combat effectiveness, Kutuzov retreated from Moscow, first to the southeast along the Ryazan road, but then, turning west, he flanked the French army, occupied the village of Tarutino, blocking the Kaluga road. gu. The foundation for the final defeat of the “great army” was laid in the Tarutino camp.

When Moscow burned, bitterness against the occupiers reached its highest intensity. The main forms of war of the Russian people against Napoleon's invasion were passive resistance (refusal of trade with the enemy, leaving grain unharvested in the fields, destruction of food and fodder, going into the forests), guerrilla warfare and mass participation in militias. The course of the war was most influenced by the refusal of the Russian peasantry to supply the enemy with provisions and fodder. The French army was on the verge of starvation.

From June to August 1812, Napoleon's army, pursuing the retreating Russian armies, covered about 1,200 kilometers from the Neman to Moscow. As a result, its communication lines were greatly stretched. Taking this fact into account, the command of the Russian army decided to create flying partisan detachments to operate in the rear and on the enemy’s communication lines, with the goal of impeding his supply and destroying his small detachments. The most famous, but far from the only commander of flying squads, was Denis Davydov. Army partisan detachments received full support from the spontaneously emerging peasant partisan movement. As the French army advanced deeper into Russia, as violence on the part of Napoleonic army grew, after fires in Smolensk and Moscow, after discipline in Napoleon’s army decreased and a significant part of it turned into a gang of marauders and robbers, the population of Russia began to move from passive to active resistance to the enemy. During its stay in Moscow alone, the French army lost more than 25 thousand people from partisan actions.

The partisans formed, as it were, the first ring of encirclement around Moscow, occupied by the French. The second ring consisted of militias. Partisans and militias surrounded Moscow in a tight ring, threatening to turn Napoleon's strategic encirclement into a tactical one.

Tarutino fight

After the surrender of Moscow, Kutuzov obviously avoided a major battle, the army accumulated strength. During this time, 205 thousand militia were recruited in the Russian provinces (Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Tula, Kaluga, Tver and others), and 75 thousand in Ukraine. By October 2, Kutuzov withdrew the army south to the village of Tarutino, closer to Kaluga.

In Moscow, Napoleon found himself in a trap; it was not possible to spend the winter in a city devastated by fire: foraging outside the city was not going well, the extended communications of the French were very vulnerable, and the army was beginning to disintegrate. Napoleon began to prepare to retreat to winter quarters somewhere between the Dnieper and Dvina.

When the “great army” retreated from Moscow, its fate was decided.

October 18(new style) Russian troops attacked and defeated near Tarutino French corps of Murat. Having lost up to 4 thousand soldiers, the French retreated. The Tarutino battle became a landmark event, marking the transition of the initiative in the war to the Russian army.

Napoleon's retreat

October 19(in modern style) the French army (110 thousand) with a huge convoy began to leave Moscow along the Old Kaluga Road. But Napoleon’s road to Kaluga was blocked by Kutuzov’s army, located near the village of Tarutino on the Old Kaluga Road. Due to the lack of horses, the French artillery fleet was reduced, and large cavalry formations practically disappeared. Not wanting to break through a fortified position with a weakened army, Napoleon turned around the village of Troitsky (modern Troitsk) onto the New Kaluga Road (modern Kiev Highway) to bypass Tarutino. However, Kutuzov transferred the army to Maloyaroslavets, cutting off the French retreat along the New Kaluga Road.

By October 22, Kutuzov's army consisted of 97 thousand regular troops, 20 thousand Cossacks, 622 guns and more than 10 thousand militia warriors. Napoleon had up to 70 thousand combat-ready soldiers at hand, the cavalry had practically disappeared, and the artillery was much weaker than the Russian one.

October 12 (24) took place battle of Maloyaroslavets. The city changed hands eight times. In the end, the French managed to capture Maloyaroslavets, but Kutuzov took a fortified position outside the city, which Napoleon did not dare to storm. On October 26, Napoleon ordered a retreat north to Borovsk-Vereya-Mozhaisk.

In the battles for Maloyaroslavets, the Russian army solved a major strategic problem - it thwarted the plan for the French troops to break through to Ukraine and forced the enemy to retreat along the Old Smolensk Road, which they had destroyed.

From Mozhaisk the French army resumed its movement towards Smolensk along the road along which it advanced on Moscow

The final defeat of the French troops took place when crossing the Berezina. The battles of November 26-29 between the French corps and the Russian armies of Chichagov and Wittgenstein on both banks of the Berezina River during Napoleon's crossing went down in history as battle on the Berezina.

The French retreat through the Berezina on November 17 (29), 1812. Peter von Hess (1844)

When crossing the Berezina, Napoleon lost 21 thousand people. In total, up to 60 thousand people managed to cross the Berezina, most of them civilians and non-combat-ready remnants of the “Great Army”. Unusually severe frosts, which struck during the crossing of the Berezina and continued in the following days, finally exterminated the French, already weakened by hunger. On December 6, Napoleon left his army and went to Paris to recruit new soldiers to replace those killed in Russia.

The main result of the battle on the Berezina was that Napoleon avoided complete defeat in conditions of significant superiority of Russian forces. In the memories of the French, the crossing of the Berezina occupies no less place than the largest Battle of Borodino.

By the end of December, the remnants of Napoleon's army were expelled from Russia.

Results of the war

The main result of the Patriotic War of 1812 was the almost complete destruction of Napoleon's Grand Army. Napoleon lost about 580 thousand soldiers in Russia. These losses include 200 thousand killed, from 150 to 190 thousand prisoners, about 130 thousand deserters who fled to their homeland. The losses of the Russian army, according to some estimates, amounted to 210 thousand soldiers and militias.

In January 1813, the “Foreign Campaign of the Russian Army” began - the fighting moved to the territory of Germany and France. In October 1813, Napoleon was defeated in the Battle of Leipzig, and in April 1814 he abdicated the throne of France.

The victory over Napoleon raised the international prestige of Russia as never before, which played a decisive role at the Congress of Vienna and in the following decades exercised a decisive influence on European affairs.

Key dates

12 June 1812- invasion of Napoleon's army into Russia across the Neman River. 3 Russian armies were at a great distance from each other. Tormasov's army, being in Ukraine, could not participate in the war. It turned out that only 2 armies took the blow. But they had to retreat to connect.

August 3rd- a connection between the armies of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly near Smolensk. The enemies lost about 20 thousand, and ours about 6 thousand, but Smolensk had to be abandoned. Even the united armies were 4 times smaller than the enemy!

8 August- Kutuzov was appointed commander-in-chief. An experienced strategist, wounded many times in battles, Suvorov's student was liked by the people.

August, 26th- The Battle of Borodino lasted more than 12 hours. It is considered a general battle. On the approaches to Moscow, the Russians showed massive heroism. The enemy's losses were greater, but our army could not go on the offensive. The numerical superiority of the enemies was still great. Reluctantly, they decided to surrender Moscow in order to save the army.

September October- seat of Napoleon's army in Moscow. His expectations were not met. It was not possible to win. Kutuzov rejected requests for peace. The attempt to escape to the south failed.

October December- expulsion of Napoleon's army from Russia along the destroyed Smolensk road. From 600 thousand enemies there are about 30 thousand left!

December 25, 1812- Emperor Alexander I issued a manifesto on the victory of Russia. But the war had to be continued. Napoleon still had armies in Europe. If they are not defeated, he will attack Russia again. The foreign campaign of the Russian army lasted until victory in 1814.

Perception of the events of the Patriotic War of 1812 by the Russian common people

The topic of perception of the events of the War of 1812 by contemporaries remains one of the least developed in the extensive historiography of this event. The focus remains exclusively on the military and political aspects of the topic.

We have been interested in this problem for a long time. Back in 1882 N.F. Dubrovin spoke about the need to create a non-military history of 1812; in 1895, he published a number of interesting articles about the perception of Napoleon by Russian society at the beginning of the 19th century.

In 1893, on the pages of the magazine “Russian Antiquity” V.A. Bilbasov wrote that the study of the influence of the War of 1812 on contemporaries (both representatives of the educated class and the common people) is especially interesting for history; numerous memoirs of the era contain valuable material on this issue. In the famous seven-volume book “The Patriotic War and Russian Society,” in the creation of which more than 60 prominent Russian historians participated, only a few articles contained material about the perception of the events of the Patriotic War by Russian contemporaries (educated society). Almost nothing was said about the attitude of the bulk of the population (the peasantry, common people in cities, semi-educated urban society) to the war; only information was given about the anti-serfdom uprisings of 1812, as well as some general discussions about “the people in 1812”, which were not based on to sources.

Until the revolution of 1917, according to the prominent historian K.A. Voensky, the “everyday” history of 1812 remained completely undeveloped.

During the Soviet period, the topic of the Patriotic War of 1812 remained unclaimed until 1937. In the 1920s, the theory of “historian number one” M.N. Pokrovsky, voiced in his “History of Russia in the most concise outline”, as well as in the collection “Diplomacy and wars of Tsarist Russia in the 19th century”. The author, as he himself admitted, basically “reframed literature”; he portrayed the War of 1812 as a struggle between reactionary Russia and the progressive Napoleonic army, the bearer of democratic principles. The people in 1812 thought only about liberation and the overthrow of the hated regime. The work of Z. and G. Gukovsky “Peasants in 1812” was written in the same spirit.

Since the late 1930s and especially after 1951, Soviet historians have actually revived the monarchical myth about the people during the Patriotic War of 1812, only without the tsar. The people acted as a faceless gray mass, doing nothing but performing patriotic deeds.

Of the works related to the topic of perception of the War of 1812 by contemporaries, two articles devoted to educated Russian society were published in the Soviet period.

Among the latest studies, only one article can be noted, also devoted to the reflection of the events of 1812 in the consciousness of an educated society (based on letters from contemporaries). The bulk of Russians in 1812 again remained outside the field of view of researchers. As far as we know, there are no special studies of the problem of perception of the War of 1812 by the common people.

The main source for studying the Russian common people of 1812 are memoirs of Russians and foreigners. Among the memoirs of Russian educated society, there is very little information about the people, since memoirists had almost no contact with them and, as a rule, did not consider the “rabble” worthy of their attention. A typical example is the famous memoirs of A.T. Bolotov, who left one of the largest memoir works of the 18th - early 19th centuries. (still not published in full). As soon as his notes talk about the “rabble,” the “vile people,” the author immediately says that everything related to this “does not deserve any attention.” As Bolotov himself points out, he first became acquainted with the “Russian people” in 1762, when he rounded up all his peasants to build a garden. The nobles of 1812 did not know their people at all, moving exclusively in a narrow circle of select society - for example, the landowner M.A. Volkova first became acquainted with provincial society (Tambova) in 1812; this happened as a result of extreme military circumstances that forced her to leave Moscow. Also as a result of this move, she gained some insight into the “people” by observing the warriors from the window of her house.

Of the memoirs of an educated society, the most interesting for research are the memoirs of the Muscovite A. Ryazantsev, who survived the entire period of occupation of the capital and left detailed notes about this time. The author himself was very close to the urban common people; in 1812 he was 14 years old, he studied at the Slavic-Greek-Latin Academy. His memoirs paint a detailed portrait of Moscow in 1812: the author used many recordings of peasant conversations, dialogues between the Moscow common people and residents of villages near Moscow, described in detail the situation in Moscow under the French, and provided valuable data on contacts between the local population and the enemy.

In addition, some interesting information about the masses of 1812 is scattered throughout the extensive memoir literature of other representatives of the educated Russian class; synchronistic sources - diaries and letters - are of particular interest.

The main source for studying our topic is the memoirs of the representatives of the common people themselves in 1812: soldiers, peasants, servants, poor merchants and priests of the lowest rank. Unfortunately, the tradition of writing memoirs among the bulk of Russian contemporaries in 1812 was completely absent: during the entire 18th century, only 250 Russians left memoirs, of which only one peasant Memories created by the representatives of the common people themselves in 1812 are an extremely rare phenomenon; as a rule, their memories have come to us in the form of recordings of oral stories.

We know of one memoir by a soldier from 1812 and two memoirs from 1839 from the words of a private and a non-commissioned officer who participated in the Battle of Borodino. “Notes” of Pamfiliya Nazarov is a rare work of memoirs written by a soldier in 1812. The author is completely alien to any historical or ideological assessments of the events of 1812-1814; he is poorly aware of the importance of what he experienced. In form, these are notes for himself and a narrow circle of loved ones, which he wrote in 1836 at the end of his service. The publishers of Russian Antiquity noted the uniqueness of this source, which is “unlike anything else.”

The works of I.N. stand apart. Skobelev, published in the 1830-1840s. The author served in the lower ranks for more than four years in the 1800s, subsequently rising to the rank of general, and a participant in the Patriotic War (with the rank of captain). Contemporaries quite reasonably claimed that he knew the Russian soldier like no one else. In his works “Soldier's Correspondence of 1812” and “Stories of a Russian Armless Disabled Person,” the author describes the events of the Patriotic War on behalf of a simple soldier. These books contain the most valuable material: this is the soldier’s language of the era of 1812 and the peculiarities of the perception of war by Russian soldiers, conveyed by Skobelev.

Of particular interest are the memoirs of A.V. Nikitenko - in 1803-1824. serf Count Sheremetyev, later a professor at St. Petersburg University and a prominent official of the Ministry of Public Education. The author describes in detail the life and morals of serfs, provincial society in Russia in the 1800-1820s.

The most valuable material on the topic was collected in the 1860s - 1880s. writer E.V. Novosiltseva (pseudonym of T. Tolychev). She focused on collecting memories of 1812 among the common people; as a result of searches in Moscow and Smolensk, she collected unique memories of surviving witnesses of the Patriotic War from peasants, former serfs and courtyard servants, merchants and clergy. In total, she managed to record the memories of 33 witnesses to the war of 1812. In 1894, Novosiltseva created a work for the people, “The Old Lady’s Tale of the Twelfth Year” - a story about the events of 1812 from the beginning of the invasion to the expulsion of Napoleon from Russia, where the story is told in the first person. As Novosiltseva pointed out in the preface, the information given in the book was not fictitious, all of it was gleaned from a survey of contemporaries in 1812 from the people; many of the memories collected by the author were not published, but were reflected in this book.

An analysis of Novosiltseva’s published memoirs shows that the original notes were subjected to stylistic and systematic processing in order to give them a more coherent and literary appearance.

In 1912, on the occasion of the centenary of the Patriotic War, interesting memories and legends of residents of the Smolensk province about the period of the Napoleonic invasion, compiled from materials from local archives, as well as from interviews with old-timers, were published in the Smolensk Diocesan Gazette. It is also worth noting that the records of the memoirs of three peasants, witnesses of the crossing of Napoleon’s army across the Berezina, published in 1869, are unfortunately extremely brief and uninformative.

The main source of information about the war for most Russians in 1812 (both educated society and common people) were rumors. Printed materials played an important role; on their basis, some rumors circulating among the people were formed; During the Patriotic War, the indirect influence of the press on the population was quite significant. It is impossible to clearly separate the influence of oral and printed sources of information on Russians, since both sources were closely related.

More or less reliable information about the War of 1812 was provided by printed materials. Using them presupposes the ability to read, and the level of literacy in Russia in 1812 was negligible. The most detailed and closest study of literacy in Russia to the period under study took place in 1844, 735,874 people were surveyed. :

Thus, of all respondents, only 3.6% were literate or semi-literate. In France, even by the end of the Old Order (1788-1789), the total number of literate people was at least 40% of the population (52% of men and about 27% of women), during the Revolution and especially under Napoleon, many new schools were opened, education was provided free of charge , or for the most reasonable fee.

Under Alexander I, they talked a lot about “enlightenment,” but all the achievements in this environment were purely in words: the total number of students in secular educational institutions in Russia increased from 46 thousand (1808) to 69 thousand (1824), figures so insignificant that they are hardly worth mentioning! For comparison, in Prussia with a population of 12 million in 1819, more than 1.5 million people studied in primary secular schools alone (already then almost All the school-age population was receiving education), in 1830 this number exceeded 2.2 million people.

In Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. up to 2.8 million people lived in the cities, the main population of the cities were townspeople, merchants and courtyard workers, as can be seen from the table, their level of education was approximately the same, on average about 30% of them could read, this amounted to up to 750 thousand people per the entire empire. The average literacy rate among peasants did not exceed 3%, or about 1 million people. So, the number of literate people in cities in 1812 was almost equal to the number of literate people throughout the rest of Russia.

In addition, bookstores were located exclusively in cities (in 1811, out of 115 bookstores, 85 were located in Moscow and St. Petersburg), and it was possible to subscribe to periodical publications. In addition to widespread illiteracy, the most important obstacle to the dissemination of printed materials was its high cost and, of course, the poverty of the population: in 1812, as can be seen from advertisements placed in the St. Petersburg Gazette and Moskovskie Gazette, the average cost of a book was 5-7 rubles, and the price of an annual subscription to a newspaper or magazine is 15-20 rubles, amounts unthinkable for most Russians. For clarity, we present information on the earnings of residents of territories that were invaded by Napoleonic troops (although these data refer to the 1840s, they almost correspond to the realities of 1812): in the fairly rich Moscow province, a farmer earned an average of 35-47 rubles. per year, in the Vitebsk province - 12-20 rubles, less often - 36 rubles, in Smolensk - 10-15 rubles, very rarely - up to 40 rubles. (women and teenagers were paid several times less); the majority of city residents (burghers) at that time did not have regular earnings, their incomes were extremely low; Moscow coachmen were in the most privileged position, receiving up to 20-30 rubles. per month (240-360 rubles per year), as well as watchmen and janitors who earned 100-130 rubles. per month, but the latter constituted an extremely small part of the population.

Domestic books had the least influence on the population. According to researchers, the total number of active readers in Russia in 1820 was only 50 thousand people, or less than 0.1% of the Empire's population. The number of publications was extremely small, they almost did not touch upon any current topics, most of them were novels. In the most educated Moscow, in 1803, only about 20 thousand books were sold in a population of 250 thousand people, i.e. one book for every ten people. Presumably, the greatest influence on the common people of the World War II era was a small essay by F.V. Rostopchin “Thoughts out loud on the Red Porch of the Russian nobleman Sila Andreevich Bogatyrev,” published in 1807 and sold an unprecedented 7 thousand copies. As far as we know, this is the most widely circulated work of secular literature of that time, and it is also one of the few books addressed to the people. The work is a monologue of a tipsy nobleman trying to speak in a “folk style.” In fact, this is a complete slur against the French and their imitators, where the French are presented as worthless and insignificant people. The book contributed to the maintenance of frivolous and mischievous sentiments among the people. During the 1812 campaign, only a few propaganda books about the war were published; they were initially aimed at the upper strata of society, and overall their influence was negligible.

More or less timely information about events was provided by periodicals. Due to censorship restrictions (despite the liberal censorship statute of 1804), she also almost did not touch on current topics, and in fact did not have the right to express her point of view on anything. The situation as a whole almost corresponded to the words of L.V. Dubelt about the rights of the periodical press, said in a conversation with F.V. Bulgarin in 1826: “Theater, exhibitions, guest houses, flea markets, taverns, confectionery shops - this is your area, and not a step further!”

In 1801-1806. in Russia there were only 27 newspapers and magazines, by 1810 - 60, by 1824 - 67 (of which only 33 were in Russian). The most widely circulated periodical publications during this period were the newspaper “Northern Post”, which had 1,768 subscribers in 1810, and 2,306 by 1816, and the magazine “Bulletin of Europe” with a circulation of 1,200 copies. (1802), by 1820 this figure had dropped to 1 thousand copies. The popular patriotic magazine of S. N. Glinka “Russian Messenger” in 1811 had only 750 subscribers (of which 300 were in Moscow). Other publications were published in microscopic editions. Under Alexander I, the newspaper “Russian Invalid” had the largest circulation - 4 thousand copies (1821). In general, the reading audience of Russian periodicals was very small, however, as already mentioned, it had an indirect influence on the common people.

In Russian villages in 1812, newspapers and magazines were common, and here literate people read them in the presence of the entire population. It should be especially noted that the trust in the printed word among the common people of that time was enormous. In 1807-1812. For political reasons, the government diligently hid its contradictions with France; only brief correspondence appeared on the pages of newspapers, reporting, as a rule, about the successes of the French. Extremely valuable evidence of the influence of the press on the common people is contained in the secret report of the head of the office of the Special Department of the Ministry of Police M.Ya. von Fock (from May 15, 1812): “unenlightened people living inside the Empire, and especially the middle class and common people, accustomed to considering everything that is printed as an irrefutable truth, become despondent and hear only about victories and conquests Napoleon, who enslaves all peoples, loses the spirit of vigor, especially in remote cities and villages, where every sexton and literate is a luminary and every printed line is a Gospel.”

Information from the pre-war press about Napoleon's successes caused panic among the Russian population; the rumors they generated, exaggerating everything many times over, convinced many commoners that the enemy was invincible.

During the war, Russian newspapers and magazines published official news from the army about the progress of military operations, letters, captured documents (rarely), correspondence from different places, and translations of foreign articles. In journalistic articles, the enemy was humiliated in every possible way, often in a rude manner, and the idea of ​​​​the superiority of everything Russian over foreign was promoted. During 1812, the main printed source of information about the war were flying leaflets published by the army's field printing house and sent to officials; the texts of these leaflets were reprinted by newspapers and published as supplements (often in a distorted form). In total, about 80 such leaflets were issued in July - December 1812. They contained daily records of army movements, military encounters, enemy losses and trophies (always greatly exaggerated), and from the autumn of 1812 they described the plight of the French army.

It was difficult for an ordinary person to understand the text of many leaflets published in the summer - early autumn of 1812, since they contained a lot of meaningless names of settlements, many names unknown to him. The leaflets were read publicly in front of a large crowd of people. DI. Zavalishin recalled how the governor of Vologda read the news about military operations, and the people listened to him and sobbed. All that could be understood was that the Russian army was retreating, and from October 1812 it was advancing.

In Moscow, posters by F.V. were very popular. Rostopchina, the governor's printed appeals to residents, written in folk style, they were very reminiscent of the chatter of the tipsy Sila Andreevich Bogatyrev. In total, researchers have identified 57 Moscow “posters” created in July-December 1812, of which the authorship of 23 is attributed to F.V. Rostopchin. The author reassured and encouraged the residents, assuring them that the enemy was about to be defeated, mocked the French, sometimes retold the contents of official news about military operations, and cited astronomical figures about the number of Russian troops. The posters were famous not only in Moscow.

Already since 1811, a wide variety of rumors were spreading among the Russian common people about the impending war with Napoleon; among the mass of absurdities, quite reliable information circulated that England and Sweden would help Russia. However, the greatest influence on the Russians of that time was not political news, but the famous comet of 1811, which began to receive close attention in August. Here's what D.I. wrote about it. Zavalishin, who lived in Tver at that time: “It was in August and, therefore, when they went to church, it was still very light. But towards the end of the all-night vigil, but before the people were leaving, an unusual movement began on the porch at the church door. People somehow came out and came in again, and as they entered, they somehow sighed heavily and began to pray earnestly. The time finally came to leave the church, but the first ones leaving stopped, and the crowd thickened so that it was impossible to squeeze through it. And so those standing behind, losing patience, began to ask loudly: “What is it?” Why aren’t they coming?” The answer was: “Star.” Little by little, however, the crowd dispersed, so that we could go out almost behind everyone and saw the famous comet of 1811 right opposite us.

The next day, even before sunset, people began to go out and look at the place where they had seen the star rising yesterday. At dusk, our square was almost completely crowded with people, so it was very difficult not only for carriages to pass, but also to push through on foot. At the site of yesterday's appearance of the star, however, there was a black cloud. Despite all this, the people did not leave, but persisted in waiting. In other parts of the sky it was clear and small stars had already appeared. But as soon as 9 o’clock struck, the cloud seemed to settle below the horizon, and yesterday’s star appeared in an even more menacing form. As if on cue, everyone took off their hats and crossed themselves. Heavy, sometimes suppressed, sometimes loud sighs were heard. They stood in silence for a long time. But then one woman fell into hysterics, others began to cry, chatter began, then loud exclamations: “It’s true, the Lord was angry with Russia,” “We sinned in the wrong way, so we waited,” etc. Comparisons began: who said that the tail of a comet this is a bunch of rods, which someone likened to a broom to sweep away all the untruths from Russia, etc. Since then, people crowded the streets every evening, and the star became more and more menacing. Rumors began about the end of the world, that Napoleon was the prophesied Antichrist, indicated directly in the apocalypse under the name of Apolion.”

Interesting information about the comet of 1811 was recorded by a contemporary of the Patriotic War, Muscovite Pyotr Kicheev (according to “Annuaire pour l'an 1832”): the light from this comet at the moment of highest tension was equal to 1/10 of the light of the full moon; on October 15, 1811, the comet approached Earth at a minimum distance (47 million leagues), the diameter of its core was 1089 leagues, and the length of the tail reached 41 million leagues (172 million 200 thousand versts). The comet occupied up to 23 degrees in the sky. Kicheev also noted the enormous impression made by the comet on Muscovites.

An inexperienced Russian in 1812 was convinced that war is God’s punishment, therefore, it cannot depend on the tricks of diplomats and the will of individuals; He tried to decipher the traces of its approach and its course by all sorts of signs (the comet of 1811, frequent fires, etc.). During the war, Russians tried to find answers to all questions in the most revered and authoritative source - the Bible. D. Zavalishin recalled how residents of the province came to people who had the Slavic Bible and asked them what was written there about Bonaparte and what he would do to Russia, deeply convinced that all this was described there. In 1812, all kinds of predictions, revelations, descriptions of signs, etc. became extremely widespread among the people.

The most detailed records of the reaction of the common people to the invasion were left by Muscovite A. Ryazantsev: after the news of the declaration of war, the Moscow people gathered in the square and began to reason. First of all, it was unanimously decided that war is God’s punishment and one should pray fervently, and one merchant said that he had long sensed something was wrong: the porridge in his pot was not cooking properly, and brownie Vaska the cat got naughty and started looking at him unkindly. Fables about the French began to spread intensively, here is one of them: “The French, having abandoned the Christian faith, turned to idolatry, invented for themselves some kind of god Clever and slavishly worship him, that this block of Clever ordered them all to be equal and free, forbade them to believe in the true God and not recognize any earthly authorities. The idolaters, obeying their idol, became indignant, plundered their churches and turned them into places of entertainment, destroyed civil laws and, to complete their atrocities, killed their innocent, good, legitimate king.” This description of the French Revolution coincides almost word for word with the description of F.V. Rostopchin from the mentioned book “Thoughts Out Loud on the Red Porch...”, which is why it is more or less plausible, here we are dealing with the indirect influence of his work, which confirms its significance for the formation of public opinion. Or: “The French surrendered to the Antichrist, chose as their commander his son Appolion, a wizard who, by the flow of the stars, determines, predicts the future, knows when to start and when to end the war, moreover, has a wife, a sorceress, who charms firearms opposed to her to my husband, that’s why the French come out victorious.” E.V. Novosiltseva wrote down some folk legends of 1812, which said that the French were afraid of the cross, etc. A. Ryazantsev recalled that in the summer of 1812, from everything he heard, his “young fantastic imagination pictured the French not as people, but as some kind of monsters with wide mouth, huge fangs, bloodshot eyes with a copper forehead and an iron body, from which bullets bounce off like peas from a wall, and bayonets and sabers break like splinters.” At the end of August 1812, he went to see a group of prisoners of war that had arrived in Moscow to make sure “whether the enemy soldiers really do not look like people, but like terrible monsters?” . Almost all of Moscow gathered to look at the prisoners.

The described rumors clearly demonstrate the worldview of the Russians - a bizarre mixture of pagan and Christian ideas. The pagan element seems to be stronger. This is most clearly confirmed by the following example: a Moscow janitor explained the cause of death of the French cavalrymen killed by the Cossacks this way: the brownie strangled them because they did not pray to God when they went to bed. A.T. Bolotov was convinced that the majority of Russian peasants remained pagans. A.V. Nikitenko, having visited the village of Timokhovka in the Mogilev province in the summer of 1839, wrote in his diary that local peasants go to pray to gods and deities.

Official propaganda added fuel to the fire; in 1812 the Synod, as before in 1807, obediently proclaimed Napoleon the Antichrist; For propaganda in the army, Professor of the University of Dorpat V. Getzel sent M.B. Barclay de Tolly wrote an article in which he proved that Napoleon is the Antichrist; he proposed distributing its contents among the soldiers. For the French this had the most dire consequences. Among the Russian common people and soldiers, the Grand Army was perceived in the most literal sense as the army of the devil. I.N. Skobelev in “Soldiers’ Correspondence of 1812” calls Napoleon “the warlock Bunaparte”, Napoleonic soldiers - “sorcerers”, describing the retreat of the Napoleonic army, he writes that Napoleon calculated when to retreat “according to his black (i.e. witchcraft) - L.A.) books."

Repeatedly distorted and completely ridiculous rumors reached the province; a resident of the Smolensk province F.I. Levitsky recalled: “It was scary in Moscow, and it was even more terrible in the district towns and villages. Something the people haven't told! Sometimes you listen to enough of this talk and you won’t be able to sleep at night.” Many residents were sure that the French... eat people! Back in 1807, when Napoleon was first declared the Antichrist by the Synod, one captured Russian officer asked the French not to eat his subordinates! Such absurd statements were based on primitive counter-revolutionary propaganda, which in every possible way depicted that in France, since 1793, it was almost the end of the world. F.V. Rostopchin in “Thoughts Out Loud...” argued that the French during the revolution fried people and ate them! F.N. Glinka seriously believed that during the revolution the French unnecessarily “killed, fried and ate many of their mayors. Their own history is not silent about this.” Colonel M.M. Petrov believed that the French guillotined during the revolution millions their compatriots. Peasant Agafya Ignatieva of the village of Volti (Smolensk province) recalled that in 1812 she was sure that the French would eat her (she was 9 years old at the time), all the peasant children thought so. Meanwhile, the French (natural French, not their allies) almost never offended children and treated them very kindly. In a number of settlements they knew nothing about the war at all. This was due to the fact that in 1812, on the territory of Belarus and central Russia (the main theater of military operations), the vast majority of villages were located far from roads, population migrations were minimal, many villages were located in impassable wilderness, where no stranger had ever set foot. In Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. the bulk of the population had absolutely no experience of communicating with foreigners; the enemy did not appear in the original Russian territories for almost 200 years, as M.I. quite rightly pointed out. Kutuzov in a conversation with the French ambassador Lauriston in the fall of 1812. Russian peasants lived in isolation and traditionally, everything new was decidedly alien to them. As can be seen from a number of memoirs, for many residents of the Russian outback, a meeting with a Napoleonic soldier was an event more surprising than a meeting with an alien for a modern person. As we showed above, the imagination of the peasants was fueled by the most monstrous rumors about the enemy, very often namely fear before the enemy as such forced them to leave their homes. Napoleonic officer Italian Ch. Laugier in his diary describes the occupation of Smolensk by the Great Army - the local residents mostly fled, those who remained hid in churches and prayed fervently, hoping that the holy place would protect them from the enemy. The Italian soldiers who entered the church, wanting to distribute food to them, were themselves dumbfounded with fear when those there began to utter wild screams of horror, it was truly animal fear .

In August 1812, a deaconess from the village of Novy Dvor (Smolensk province), seeing French cavalrymen, fainted and did not come to her senses for a long time, she was introduced to Napoleon, and she, trembling, continuously crossed herself and prayed, convinced that the French were devils from hell .

Of course, not all representatives of the common people perceived the French so primitively: an old peasant woman from the village of Staraya Rusa (80 versts from Moscow) was not afraid of the French, saying: “They won’t touch me, the old woman. And what benefit do they have in killing me? After all, they are not some kind of animals either.”

A resident of Smolensk, Kuzma Egorovich Shmatikov, talks about how differently the people perceived the war of 1812. This is how he describes the storming of Smolensk in August 1812: “I can’t tell you how afraid we were, because until then we had not They imagined how they would take the city. Well, let’s say we were children and everyone around us was women. Yes, some men reasoned no smarter than us: they thought that the armies would go against each other in fist fights. Many climbed the trees to look at it." Comments here are generally unnecessary. When Napoleon's army entered Moscow, crowds of people for about two hours (exactly as long as French troops entered the capital) argued whether it was the Swedes or the British who had come to our aid.

Having processed a large array of materials, we came to the conclusion that the behavior of the inhabitants of central Russia during 1812 can be divided into four main types: 1) panic; 2) perfect calm and arrogant, capricious mood; 3) the desire to throw off the yoke of serfdom, hope for Bonaparte’s help; 4) absolute ignorance or indifference. Arrogant sentiments and the conviction of absolute superiority over the enemy were extremely widespread among the people, especially in territories that had not been invaded. Even the most educated segments of the population had similar sentiments; the commander-in-chief of the 2nd Western Army himself, P.I. Bagration was deeply convinced that the French would be defeated instantly; on June 8, 1812, he wrote to the Tsar, begging him to allow the Russians to advance and invade Poland themselves. Many other memoirs also record similar hat-throwing sentiments; they were actively supported by the press, especially Rostopchin’s posters. P. Kicheev’s grandfather sacredly believed them and therefore remained in Moscow, one Moscow priest on the very day of the surrender of Moscow laughed at his wife, who claimed that there were French in the city, his argument was as follows: “You believe the sexton, but you don’t believe the governor general!” , when the French came to his house, he fell silent and tore up the poster.

It must be said that such sentiments instantly disappeared with the approach of the enemy, impudent self-confidence was instantly replaced by panic and apathy, which is described in detail in the memoirs.

In Russia in 1812 there were many people who thought about the possibility of freeing themselves from the yoke of serfdom; the war provided a good opportunity for this. In 1812, the serf peasantry made up about 44% of the Empire's population (23 million people), the living conditions of most serfs were monstrous both materially and morally. Recently, historiography has been actively hushing up the realities of serfdom, trying in every possible way to embellish it. The most detailed and accurate life of serfs in the early 19th century. described in the memoirs of A.V. Nikitenko, it is supplemented by the memoirs of the surgeon F. Mercier, who spent two years in Russian captivity. The vast majority of Russian landowners were small-scale landowners and, as a rule, owned several dozen peasants, and in order to live “befitting their rank,” they needed hundreds, or even thousands, of rubles a year. Knowing the size of the peasants' earnings (see above), it is not difficult to calculate that the serf gave most of the money he earned to the landowner, who sucked all the juice out of him. Add to this the robbery of estate managers, whom no one actually controlled, oppression by rich peasants, etc. For thinking people, like A.V.’s father. Nikitenko, the most terrible thing in their situation was the complete lack of rights and the terrible humiliation associated with it, to which this noble man was subjected until his death. The following figure gives an idea of ​​the scale of the atrocities of landowners against serfs: only for 1834 - 45. 2,838 landowners were brought to trial for cruel treatment of peasants, of which 630 were convicted. At the same time, the vast majority of crimes of landowners remained unpunished.

According to historians, only for 1796-1825. In Russia there were more than 1,200 large peasant uprisings; these numbers are far from complete. Since 1961, it has been believed that in 1812 there were 60-67 anti-serfdom uprisings; this figure is greatly underestimated and needs clarification. Information about the uprisings in the occupied territories, which were most affected by the anti-serfdom movement, is almost completely ignored here. As noted by contemporaries, in particular the brigadier general of the Great Army Dedem de Gelder, the intendant of the Vitebsk province A. Pastore (an official of the French occupation administration), who acted behind the French lines, partisans A.Kh. Benkendorf, all Belarus (the territories of Vitebsk, Minsk and Mogilev provinces) was engulfed in an anti-serfdom fire, the peasants here rebelled against their landowners everywhere.

Sometimes anti-serfdom uprisings occurred “not without incitement from the enemy,” such as, for example, a major uprising on the Baryshnikov estate in Dorogobuzh district.

Hatred towards the nobles continued to smolder among the people; only 37 years had passed since the Pugachev era in 1812. The nobles themselves instinctively felt this hatred and were extremely afraid of it. The number of uprisings cannot estimate the scope of anti-serfdom sentiments in 1812; it is clear from the memoirs that the hope for freedom from Bonaparte was extremely widespread. A memoirist from the Moscow common people heard with his own ears from peasants near Moscow, who were ordered by the bar to prepare horses: “What! We will begin to train horses about the master's good. Bonaparte will come and give us freedom, but we don’t want to know the masters anymore!” Only after making sure that the French were robbing and not giving freedom, these peasants went into the forest. Former serf A.A. Sazonova recalled that “the people grumbled very much against the masters,” Muscovite G.Ya. Kozlovsky, who survived the occupation of Moscow, claimed that he was afraid of Russian men much more than the French. D.M. Volkonsky noted with horror in his diary on September 10, 1812 that the people were already ready for unrest. Marshal L.G. Saint-Cyr was absolutely right when he wrote that the war of 1812 demonstrated the internal weakness of Russia, the French simply did not take advantage of it.

A.V. left valuable evidence about the attitude towards the war in the provinces. Nikitenko (lived in Ukraine in 1812): “It is strange that at this moment of strong upheavals that Russia was experiencing, not only our close circle, with the exception of young Tatarchukov, but also the entire surrounding society was indifferent to the fate of the fatherland. ...I have never heard in their conversations a note of warm concern for the events of the time. Everyone, apparently, was only interested in their own personal affairs. The name Napoleon evoked surprise rather than hatred. In a word, our society was striking in its equanimity towards the misfortune that threatened Russia. This could partly stem from the remoteness of the theater of war... But the main reason for this, I believe, was hidden in the apathy characteristic of people alienated, as the Russians were then, from participation in public affairs and accustomed not to talk about what is happening around them, but just unquestioningly obey the orders of your superiors.”

In Russian historiography, the myth is often repeated that in 1812 the people happily joined the army. It is based on the memories of representatives of the nobility. Let us present the most valuable evidence from the diary of Rostov official M.I. Marakueva, entry dated July 12, 1812: Emperor Alexander arrived in the Kremlin, a huge number of people gathered, suddenly a rumor spread that they would order “to lock all the gates and take everyone by force as soldiers. As soon as this rumor had spread, the mob rushed out and in a few minutes the Kremlin was empty. An echo echoed from the Kremlin throughout Moscow and many black people fled from it.” This happened in the presence of the emperor himself! The next day, outside Moscow, he met crowds of men fleeing the capital. They asked him if they were taking him as a soldier in Moscow. P. Nazarov, drafted into the army in September 1812, wrote that no one from his village wanted to serve. During the war, authorities repeatedly reassured the militia by confirming that they were serving in the army only temporarily. The war ends sooner or later, and you will have to serve for 25 years; if you are not killed, you will be disabled, most likely without a pension. P. Nazarov received a pension of 20 rubles for 25 years of service and several serious wounds. per year, this was barely enough for food. Here is what the soldiers themselves said about their problems (from the memoirs of D.I. Zavalishin): “I say the truth that even after December 14, the soldiers of those regiments and detachments where there were no members of society and, therefore, the goals of the coup were not explained to them, joined willingly talked to us... discussing the double oath to Konstantin and Nikolai, they constantly told us the same thing: “We didn’t care whether one was the other. Now, if, gentlemen, you had told us then that there would be a reduction in service, that they would not force you into a coffin with sticks, that upon retirement you would not carry a bag, and that children would not be irrevocably accepted as soldiers, well, we would have gone for that.” ". Only for 1815-1825. There were 15 uprisings in the Russian army.

As a result of the research, we have outlined some prospects for studying the topic of perception of the Patriotic War by the common people.

PATRIOTIC WAR OF 1812

Causes and nature of the war. The Patriotic War of 1812 is the largest event in Russian history. Its emergence was caused by Napoleon's desire to achieve world domination. In Europe, only Russia and England maintained their independence. Despite the Treaty of Tilsit, Russia continued to oppose the expansion of Napoleonic aggression. Napoleon was especially irritated by her systematic violation of the continental blockade. Since 1810, both sides, realizing the inevitability of a new clash, were preparing for war. Napoleon flooded the Duchy of Warsaw with his troops and created military warehouses there. The threat of invasion looms over Russia's borders. In turn, the Russian government increased the number of troops in the western provinces.

In the military conflict between the two sides, Napoleon became the aggressor. He began military operations and invaded Russian territory. In this regard, for the Russian people the war became a liberation war, a Patriotic War. Not only the regular army, but also the broad masses of the people took part in it.

Correlation of forces. In preparation for the war against Russia, Napoleon gathered a significant army - up to 678 thousand soldiers. These were perfectly armed and trained troops, seasoned in previous wars. They were led by a galaxy of brilliant marshals and generals - L. Davout, L. Berthier, M. Ney, I. Murat and others. They were commanded by the most famous commander of that time, Napoleon Bonaparte. The weak point of his army was its motley national composition. German and Spanish The aggressive plans of the French bourgeoisie were deeply alien to the Polish and Portuguese, Austrian and Italian soldiers.

Active preparations for the war that Russia had been waging since 1810 brought results. She managed to create modern armed forces for that time, powerful artillery, which, as it turned out during the war, was superior to the French. The troops were led by talented military leaders M.I. Kutuzov, M.B. Barclay de Tolly, P.I. Bagration, A.P. Ermolov, N.N. Raevsky, M.A. Miloradovich and others. They were distinguished by their great military experience and personal courage. The advantage of the Russian army was determined by the patriotic enthusiasm of all segments of the population, large human resources, food and fodder reserves.

However, at the initial stage of the war, the French army outnumbered the Russian one. The first echelon of troops that entered Russia numbered 450 thousand people, while the Russians on the western border were about 320 thousand people, divided into three armies. 1st - under the command of M.B. Barclay de Tolly - covered the St. Petersburg direction, the 2nd - led by P.I. Bagration - defended the center of Russia, the 3rd - General A.P. Tormasov - was located in the southern direction.

Plans of the parties. Napoleon planned to seize a significant part of Russian territory up to Moscow and sign a new treaty with Alexander to subjugate Russia. Napoleon's strategic plan was based on his military experience acquired during the wars in Europe. He intended to prevent the dispersed Russian forces from uniting and deciding the outcome of the war in one or more border battles.

Even on the eve of the war, the Russian emperor and his entourage decided not to make any compromises with Napoleon. If the clash was successful, they intended to transfer hostilities to the territory of Western Europe. In case of defeat, Alexander was ready to retreat to Siberia (all the way to Kamchatka, according to him) to continue the fight from there. Russia had several strategic military plans. One of them was developed by the Prussian General Fuhl. It provided for the concentration of most of the Russian army in a fortified camp near the city of Drissa on the Western Dvina. According to Fuhl, this gave an advantage in the first border battle. The project remained unrealized, since the position on Drissa was unfavorable and the fortifications were weak. In addition, the balance of forces forced the Russian command to choose a strategy of active defense, i.e. retreat with rearguard battles deep into Russian territory. As the course of the war showed, this was the most correct decision.

The beginning of the war. On the morning of June 12, 1812, French troops crossed the Neman and invaded Russia by forced march.

The 1st and 2nd Russian armies retreated, avoiding a general battle. They fought stubborn rearguard battles with individual units of the French, exhausting and weakening the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him. Two main tasks faced the Russian troops - to eliminate disunity (not allow themselves to be defeated one by one) and to establish unity of command in the army. The first task was solved on July 22, when the 1st and 2nd armies united near Smolensk. Thus, Napoleon's original plan was thwarted. On August 8, Alexander appointed M.I. Kutuzov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. This meant solving the second problem. M.I. Kutuzov took command of the combined Russian forces on 17 August. He did not change his retreat tactics. However, the army and the whole country expected a decisive battle from him. Therefore, he gave the order to look for a position for a general battle. She was found near the village of Borodino, 124 km from Moscow.

Battle of Borodino. M.I. Kutuzov chose defensive tactics and deployed his troops in accordance with this. The left flank was defended by the army of P.I. Bagration, covered with artificial earthen fortifications - flashes. In the center there was an earthen mound where the artillery and troops of General N.N. were located. Raevsky. Army M.B. Barclay de Tolly was on the right flank.

Napoleon adhered to offensive tactics. He intended to break through the defenses of the Russian army on the flanks, encircle it and completely defeat it.

Early in the morning of August 26, the French launched an offensive on the left flank. The fight for flushes lasted until 12 noon. Both sides suffered huge losses. General P.I. was seriously wounded. Bagration. (He died from his wounds a few days later.) Taking the flushes did not bring any particular advantages to the French, since they were unable to break through the left flank. The Russians retreated in an organized manner and took up a position near the Semenovsky ravine.

At the same time, the situation in the center, where Napoleon directed the main attack, became more complicated. To help the troops of General N.N. Raevsky M.I. Kutuzov ordered the Cossacks M.I. Platov and the cavalry corps F.P. Uvarov to carry out a raid behind French lines. Napoleon was forced to interrupt the assault on the battery for almost 2 hours. This allowed M.I. Kutuzov to bring fresh forces to the center. Battery N.N. Raevsky passed from hand to hand several times and was captured by the French only at 16:00.

The capture of Russian fortifications did not mean Napoleon's victory. On the contrary, the offensive impulse of the French army dried up. She needed fresh forces, but Napoleon did not dare to use his last reserve - the imperial guard. The battle, which lasted more than 12 hours, gradually subsided. The losses on both sides were enormous. Borodino was a moral and political victory for the Russians: the combat potential of the Russian army was preserved, while Napoleonic's was significantly weakened. Far from France, in the vast Russian expanses, it was difficult to restore it.

From Moscow to Maloyaroslavets. After Borodino, the Russians began to retreat to Moscow. Napoleon followed, but did not strive for a new battle. On September 1, a military council of the Russian command took place in the village of Fili. M.I. Kutuzov, contrary to the general opinion of the generals, decided to leave Moscow. The French army entered it on September 2, 1812.

M.I. Kutuzov, withdrawing troops from Moscow, carried out an original plan - the Tarutino march-maneuver. Retreating from Moscow along the Ryazan road, the army turned sharply to the south and in the Krasnaya Pakhra area reached the old Kaluga road. This maneuver, firstly, prevented the French from seizing the Kaluga and Tula provinces, where ammunition and food were collected. Secondly, M.I. Kutuzov managed to break away from Napoleon's army. He set up a camp in Tarutino, where the Russian troops rested and were replenished with fresh regular units, militia, weapons and food supplies.

The occupation of Moscow did not benefit Napoleon. Abandoned by the inhabitants (an unprecedented case in history), it burned in the fire. There was no food or other supplies in it. The French army was completely demoralized and turned into a bunch of robbers and marauders. Its decomposition was so strong that Napoleon had only two options - either immediately make peace or begin a retreat. But all the peace proposals of the French emperor were unconditionally rejected by M.I. Kutuzov and Alexander.

On October 7, the French left Moscow. Napoleon still hoped to defeat the Russians or at least break into the unravaged southern regions, since the issue of providing the army with food and fodder was very acute. He moved his troops to Kaluga. On October 12, another bloody battle took place near the town of Maloyaroslavets. Once again, neither side achieved a decisive victory. However, the French were stopped and forced to retreat along the Smolensk road they had destroyed.

Expulsion of Napoleon from Russia. The retreat of the French army looked like a disorderly flight. It was accelerated by the unfolding partisan movement and the offensive actions of Russian troops.

The patriotic upsurge began literally immediately after Napoleon entered Russia. The robberies and looting of French soldiers provoked resistance from local residents. But this was not the main thing - the Russian people could not put up with the presence of invaders on their native land. History includes the names of ordinary people (A.N. Seslavin, G.M. Kurin, E.V. Chetvertakov, V. Kozhina) who organized partisan detachments. “flying detachments” of regular army soldiers led by career officers were also sent to the French rear.

At the final stage of the war, M.I. Kutuzov chose the tactics of parallel pursuit. He took care of every Russian soldier and understood that the enemy’s forces were melting every day. The final defeat of Napoleon was planned near the city of Borisov. For this purpose, troops were brought up from the south and north-west. Serious damage was inflicted on the French near the city of Krasny in early November, when more than half of the 50 thousand people of the retreating army were captured or died in battle. Fearing encirclement, Napoleon hastened to transport his troops across the Berezina River on November 14-17. The battle at the crossing completed the defeat of the French army. Napoleon abandoned her and secretly left for Paris. Order M.I. Kutuzov on the army on December 21 and the Tsar's Manifesto on December 25, 1812 marked the end of the Patriotic War.

The meaning of war. The Patriotic War of 1812 is the greatest event in Russian History. During its course, heroism, courage, patriotism and selfless love of all layers of society and especially ordinary people for their own were clearly demonstrated. Homeland. However, the war caused significant damage to the Russian economy, which was estimated at 1 billion rubles. About 2 million people died. Many western regions of the country were devastated. All this had a huge impact on the further internal development of Russia.

What you need to know about this topic:

Socio-economic development of Russia in the first half of the 19th century. Social structure of the population.

Development of agriculture.

Development of Russian industry in the first half of the 19th century. The formation of capitalist relations. Industrial revolution: essence, prerequisites, chronology.

Development of water and highway communications. Start of railway construction.

Exacerbation of socio-political contradictions in the country. The palace coup of 1801 and the accession to the throne of Alexander I. “The days of Alexander were a wonderful beginning.”

Peasant question. Decree "On Free Plowmen". Government measures in the field of education. State activities of M.M. Speransky and his plan for state reforms. Creation of the State Council.

Russia's participation in anti-French coalitions. Treaty of Tilsit.

Patriotic War of 1812. International relations on the eve of the war. Causes and beginning of the war. Balance of forces and military plans of the parties. M.B. Barclay de Tolly. P.I. Bagration. M.I.Kutuzov. Stages of war. Results and significance of the war.

Foreign campaigns of 1813-1814. Congress of Vienna and its decisions. Holy Alliance.

The internal situation of the country in 1815-1825. Strengthening conservative sentiments in Russian society. A.A. Arakcheev and Arakcheevism. Military settlements.

Foreign policy of tsarism in the first quarter of the 19th century.

The first secret organizations of the Decembrists were the “Union of Salvation” and the “Union of Prosperity”. Northern and Southern society. The main program documents of the Decembrists are “Russian Truth” by P.I. Pestel and “Constitution” by N.M. Muravyov. Death of Alexander I. Interregnum. Uprising on December 14, 1825 in St. Petersburg. Uprising of the Chernigov regiment. Investigation and trial of the Decembrists. The significance of the Decembrist uprising.

The beginning of the reign of Nicholas I. Strengthening autocratic power. Further centralization and bureaucratization of the Russian state system. Intensifying repressive measures. Creation of the III department. Censorship regulations. The era of censorship terror.

Codification. M.M. Speransky. Reform of state peasants. P.D. Kiselev. Decree "On Obligated Peasants".

Polish uprising 1830-1831

The main directions of Russian foreign policy in the second quarter of the 19th century.

Eastern question. Russian-Turkish War 1828-1829 The problem of the straits in Russian foreign policy in the 30s and 40s of the 19th century.

Russia and the revolutions of 1830 and 1848. in Europe.

Crimean War. International relations on the eve of the war. Causes of the war. Progress of military operations. Russia's defeat in the war. Peace of Paris 1856. International and domestic consequences of the war.

Annexation of the Caucasus to Russia.

The formation of the state (imamate) in the North Caucasus. Muridism. Shamil. Caucasian War. The significance of the annexation of the Caucasus to Russia.

Social thought and social movement in Russia in the second quarter of the 19th century.

Formation of government ideology. The theory of official nationality. Mugs from the late 20s - early 30s of the 19th century.

N.V. Stankevich’s circle and German idealistic philosophy. A.I. Herzen’s circle and utopian socialism. "Philosophical Letter" by P.Ya.Chaadaev. Westerners. Moderate. Radicals. Slavophiles. M.V. Butashevich-Petrashevsky and his circle. The theory of "Russian socialism" by A.I. Herzen.

Socio-economic and political prerequisites for bourgeois reforms of the 60-70s of the 19th century.

Peasant reform. Preparation of reform. "Regulation" February 19, 1861 Personal liberation of the peasants. Allotments. Ransom. Duties of peasants. Temporary condition.

Zemstvo, judicial, urban reforms. Financial reforms. Reforms in the field of education. Censorship rules. Military reforms. The meaning of bourgeois reforms.

Socio-economic development of Russia in the second half of the 19th century. Social structure of the population.

Industrial development. Industrial revolution: essence, prerequisites, chronology. The main stages of the development of capitalism in industry.

The development of capitalism in agriculture. Rural community in post-reform Russia. Agrarian crisis of the 80-90s of the XIX century.

Social movement in Russia in the 50-60s of the 19th century.

Social movement in Russia in the 70-90s of the 19th century.

Revolutionary populist movement of the 70s - early 80s of the 19th century.

"Land and Freedom" of the 70s of the XIX century. "People's Will" and "Black Redistribution". Assassination of Alexander II on March 1, 1881. The collapse of Narodnaya Volya.

Labor movement in the second half of the 19th century. Strike struggle. The first workers' organizations. A work issue arises. Factory legislation.

Liberal populism of the 80-90s of the 19th century. Spread of the ideas of Marxism in Russia. Group "Emancipation of Labor" (1883-1903). The emergence of Russian social democracy. Marxist circles of the 80s of the XIX century.

St. Petersburg "Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class." V.I. Ulyanov. "Legal Marxism".

Political reaction of the 80-90s of the XIX century. The era of counter-reforms.

Alexander III. Manifesto on the “inviolability” of autocracy (1881). The policy of counter-reforms. Results and significance of counter-reforms.

International position of Russia after the Crimean War. Changing the country's foreign policy program. The main directions and stages of Russian foreign policy in the second half of the 19th century.

Russia in the system of international relations after the Franco-Prussian war. Union of Three Emperors.

Russia and the Eastern crisis of the 70s of the XIX century. The goals of Russia's policy in the eastern question. Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878: causes, plans and forces of the parties, course of military operations. Treaty of San Stefano. Berlin Congress and its decisions. The role of Russia in the liberation of the Balkan peoples from the Ottoman yoke.

Foreign policy of Russia in the 80-90s of the XIX century. Formation of the Triple Alliance (1882). Deterioration of Russia's relations with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Conclusion of the Russian-French alliance (1891-1894).

• Buganov V.I., Zyryanov P.N. History of Russia: the end of the 17th - 19th centuries. . - M.: Education, 1996.

Causes and nature of the war. The outbreak of the Patriotic War of 1812 was caused by Napoleon's desire for world domination. In Europe, only Russia and England maintained their independence. Despite the Treaty of Tilsit, Russia continued to oppose the expansion of Napoleonic aggression. Napoleon was especially irritated by her systematic violation of the continental blockade. Since 1810, both sides, realizing the inevitability of a new clash, were preparing for war. Napoleon flooded the Duchy of Warsaw with his troops and created military warehouses there. The threat of invasion looms over Russia's borders. In turn, the Russian government increased the number of troops in the western provinces.

Napoleon became the aggressor. He began military operations and invaded Russian territory. In this regard, for the Russian people the war became a liberation and Patriotic war, since not only the regular army, but also the broad masses of the people took part in it.

Correlation of forces. In preparation for the war against Russia, Napoleon gathered a significant army - up to 678 thousand soldiers. These were perfectly armed and trained troops, seasoned in previous wars. They were led by a galaxy of brilliant marshals and generals - L. Davout, L. Berthier, M. Ney, I. Murat and others. They were commanded by the most famous commander of that time - Napoleon Bonaparte. The weak point of his army was its motley national composition. The aggressive plans of the French emperor were deeply alien to the German and Spanish, Polish and Portuguese, Austrian and Italian soldiers.

Active preparations for the war that Russia had been waging since 1810 brought results. She managed to create modern armed forces for that time, powerful artillery, which, as it turned out during the war, was superior to the French. The troops were led by talented military leaders - M. I. Kutuzov, M. B. Barclay de Tolly, P. I. Bagration, A. P. Ermolov, N. N. Raevsky, M. A. Miloradovich and others. They were distinguished by extensive military experience and personal courage. The advantage of the Russian army was determined by the patriotic enthusiasm of all segments of the population, large human resources, food and fodder reserves.

However, at the initial stage of the war, the French army outnumbered the Russian one. The first echelon of troops that entered Russia numbered 450 thousand people, while the Russians on the western border were about 210 thousand people, divided into three armies. The 1st - under the command of M.B. Barclay de Tolly - covered the St. Petersburg direction, the 2nd - led by P.I. Bagration - defended the center of Russia, the 3rd - under General A.P. Tormasov - was located in the southern direction .

Plans of the parties. Napoleon planned to seize a significant part of Russian territory up to Moscow and sign a new treaty with Alexander to subjugate Russia. Napoleon's strategic plan was based on his military experience acquired during the wars in Europe. He intended to prevent the dispersed Russian forces from uniting and deciding the outcome of the war in one or more border battles.

Even on the eve of the war, the Russian emperor and his entourage decided not to make any compromises with Napoleon. If the clash was successful, they intended to transfer hostilities to the territory of Western Europe. In case of defeat, Alexander was ready to retreat to Siberia (all the way to Kamchatka, according to him) to continue the fight from there. Russia had several strategic military plans. One of them was developed by the Prussian General Fuhl. It provided for the concentration of most of the Russian army in a fortified camp near the city of Drissa on the Western Dvina. According to Fuhl, this gave an advantage in the first border battle. The project remained unrealized, since the position on Drissa was unfavorable and the fortifications were weak. In addition, the balance of forces forced the Russian command to initially choose a strategy of active defense. As the course of the war showed, this was the most correct decision.

Stages of war. The history of the Patriotic War of 1812 is divided into two stages. First: from June 12 to mid-October - the retreat of the Russian army with rearguard battles in order to lure the enemy deep into Russian territory and disrupt his strategic plan. Second: from mid-October to December 25 - a counter-offensive of the Russian army with the goal of completely expelling the enemy from Russia.

The beginning of the war. On the morning of June 12, 1812, French troops crossed the Neman and invaded Russia by forced march.

The 1st and 2nd Russian armies retreated, avoiding a general battle. They fought stubborn rearguard battles with individual units of the French, exhausting and weakening the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him.

Two main tasks faced the Russian troops - to eliminate disunity (not allow themselves to be defeated one by one) and to establish unity of command in the army. The first task was solved on July 22, when the 1st and 2nd armies united near Smolensk. Thus, Napoleon's original plan was thwarted. On August 8, Alexander appointed M.I. Kutuzov Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. This meant solving the second problem. M.I. Kutuzov took command of the combined Russian forces on August 17. He did not change his retreat tactics. However, the army and the whole country expected a decisive battle from him. Therefore, he gave the order to look for a position for a general battle. She was found near the village of Borodino, 124 km from Moscow.

battle of Borodino. M.I. Kutuzov chose defensive tactics and deployed his troops in accordance with this. The left flank was defended by the army of P.I. Bagration, covered by artificial earthen fortifications - flushes. In the center there was an earthen mound where the artillery and troops of General N.N. Raevsky were located. The army of M.B. Barclay de Tolly was on the right flank.

Napoleon adhered to offensive tactics. He intended to break through the defenses of the Russian army on the flanks, encircle it and completely defeat it.

The balance of forces was almost equal: the French had 130 thousand people with 587 guns, the Russians had 110 thousand regular forces, about 40 thousand militias and Cossacks with 640 guns.

Early in the morning of August 26, the French launched an offensive on the left flank. The fight for flushes lasted until 12 noon. Both sides suffered huge losses. General P.I. Bagration was seriously wounded. (He died from his wounds a few days later.) Taking the flushes did not bring any particular advantages to the French, since they were unable to break through the left flank. The Russians retreated in an organized manner and took up a position near the Semenovsky ravine.

At the same time, the situation in the center, where Napoleon directed the main attack, became more complicated. To help the troops of General N.N. Raevsky, M.I. Kutuzov ordered the Cossacks of M.I. Platov and the cavalry corps of F.P. Uvarov to carry out a raid behind French lines. The sabotage, which was not very successful in itself, forced Napoleon to interrupt the assault on the battery for almost 2 hours. This allowed M.I. Kutuzov to bring fresh forces to the center. The battery of N.N. Raevsky changed hands several times and was captured by the French only at 16:00.

The capture of Russian fortifications did not mean Napoleon's victory. On the contrary, the offensive impulse of the French army dried up. She needed fresh forces, but Napoleon did not dare to use his last reserve - the imperial guard. The battle, which lasted more than 12 hours, gradually subsided. The losses on both sides were enormous. Borodino was a moral and political victory for the Russians: the combat potential of the Russian army was preserved, while Napoleonic's was significantly weakened. Far from France, in the vast Russian expanses, it was difficult to restore it.

From Moscow to Maloyaroslavets. After Borodino, Russian troops began to retreat to Moscow. Napoleon followed, but did not strive for a new battle. On September 1, a military council of the Russian command took place in the village of Fili. M.I. Kutuzov, contrary to the general opinion of the generals, decided to leave Moscow. The French army entered it on September 2, 1812.

M.I. Kutuzov, withdrawing troops from Moscow, carried out an original plan - the Tarutino march-maneuver. Retreating from Moscow along the Ryazan road, the army turned sharply to the south and in the Krasnaya Pakhra area reached the old Kaluga road. This maneuver, firstly, prevented the French from seizing the Kaluga and Tula provinces, where ammunition and food were collected. Secondly, M.I. Kutuzov managed to break away from Napoleon’s army. He set up a camp in Tarutino, where the Russian troops rested and were replenished with fresh regular units, militia, weapons and food supplies.

The occupation of Moscow did not benefit Napoleon. Abandoned by the inhabitants (an unprecedented case in history), it burned in the fire. There was no food or other supplies in it. The French army was completely demoralized and turned into a bunch of robbers and marauders. Its decomposition was so strong that Napoleon had only two options - either immediately make peace or begin a retreat. But all the peace proposals of the French emperor were unconditionally rejected by M. I. Kutuzov and Alexander I.

On October 7, the French left Moscow. Napoleon still hoped to defeat the Russians or at least break into the unravaged southern regions, since the issue of providing the army with food and fodder was very acute. He moved his troops to Kaluga. On October 12, another bloody battle took place near the town of Maloyaroslavets. Once again, neither side achieved a decisive victory. However, the French were stopped and forced to retreat along the Smolensk road they had destroyed.

Expulsion of Napoleon from Russia. The retreat of the French army looked like a disorderly flight. It was accelerated by the unfolding partisan movement and the offensive actions of the Russians.

The patriotic upsurge began literally immediately after Napoleon entered Russia. Robbery and looting French. The Russian soldiers provoked resistance from local residents. But this was not the main thing - the Russian people could not put up with the presence of invaders on their native land. History includes the names of ordinary people (G. M. Kurin, E. V. Chetvertakov, V. Kozhina) who organized partisan detachments. “Flying detachments” of regular army soldiers led by career officers (A.S. Figner, D.V. Davydov, A.N. Seslavin, etc.) were also sent to the French rear.

At the final stage of the war, M.I. Kutuzov chose the tactics of parallel pursuit. He took care of every Russian soldier and understood that the enemy’s forces were melting every day. The final defeat of Napoleon was planned near the city of Borisov. For this purpose, troops were brought up from the south and north-west. Serious damage was inflicted on the French near the city of Krasny in early November, when more than half of the 50 thousand people of the retreating army were captured or died in battle. Fearing encirclement, Napoleon hastened to transport his troops across the Berezina River on November 14-17. The battle at the crossing completed the defeat of the French army. Napoleon abandoned her and secretly left for Paris. The order of M.I. Kutuzov on the army of December 21 and the Tsar's Manifesto of December 25, 1812 marked the end of the Patriotic War.

The meaning of war. The Patriotic War of 1812 is the greatest event in Russian history. During its course, heroism, courage, patriotism and selfless love of all layers of society and especially ordinary people for their Motherland were clearly demonstrated. However, the war caused significant damage to the Russian economy, which was estimated at 1 billion rubles. During the hostilities, about 300 thousand people died. Many western regions were devastated. All this had a huge impact on the further internal development of Russia.

46. ​​Internal policy of Russia 1812 – 1825. Decembrist movement

And invaded Russian lands. The French rushed to the offensive like a bull during a bullfight. Napoleon's army included a European hodgepodge: in addition to the French, there were also (forcedly recruited) Germans, Austrians, Spaniards, Italians, Dutch, Poles and many others, totaling up to 650 thousand people. Russia could field approximately the same number of soldiers, but some of them, along with Kutuzov was still in Moldova, in another part - in the Caucasus. During Napoleon's invasion, up to 20 thousand Lithuanians joined his army.

The Russian army was divided into two lines of defense, under the command of General Peter Bagration And Michael Barclay de Tolly. The French invasion fell on the latter's troops. Napoleon's calculation was simple - one or two victorious battles (maximum three), and Alexander I will be forced to sign peace on French terms. However, Barclay de Tolly gradually, with small skirmishes, retreated deeper into Russia, but did not enter the main battle. Near Smolensk, the Russian army almost fell into encirclement, but did not enter the battle and eluded the French, continuing to draw them deeper into its territory. Napoleon occupied the empty Smolensk and could have stopped there for now, but Kutuzov, who arrived from Moldova to replace Barclay de Tolly, knew that the French emperor would not do that, and continued his retreat to Moscow. Bagration was eager to attack, and he was supported by the majority of the country's population, but Alexander did not allow it, leaving Peter Bagration on the border in Austria in case of an attack by France's allies.

All along the way, Napoleon received only abandoned and scorched settlements - no people, no supplies. After the “demonstrative” battle for Smolensk on August 18, 1812, Napoleon’s troops began to get tired of Russian campaign of 1812, since the conquest was somehow negative: there were no large-scale battles or high-profile victories, there were no captured supplies and weapons, winter was approaching, during which the “Great Army” needed to winter somewhere, and nothing suitable for quartering was captured.

Battle of Borodino.

At the end of August, near Mozhaisk (125 kilometers from Moscow), Kutuzov stopped in a field near a village Borodino, where he decided to give a general battle. For the most part, he was forced by public opinion, since a constant retreat did not correspond to the sentiments of either the people, the nobles, or the emperor.

On August 26, 1812, the famous Battle of Borodino. Bagration approached Borodino, but still the Russians were able to field just over 110 thousand soldiers. Napoleon at that moment had up to 135 thousand people.

The course and result of the battle are known to many: the French repeatedly stormed Kutuzov’s defensive redoubts with active artillery support (“Horses and people mixed up in a heap…”). The Russians, hungry for a normal battle, heroically repelled the attacks of the French, despite the latter’s enormous superiority in weapons (from rifles to cannons). The French lost up to 35 thousand killed, and the Russians ten thousand more, but Napoleon only managed to slightly shift Kutuzov’s central positions, and in fact, Bonaparte’s attack was stopped. After a battle that lasted all day, the French emperor began to prepare for a new assault, but Kutuzov, by the morning of August 27, withdrew his troops to Mozhaisk, not wanting to lose even more people.

On September 1, 1812, a military incident took place in a nearby village. council in Fili, during which Mikhail Kutuzov with the support of Barclay de Tolly, he decided to leave Moscow to save the army. Contemporaries say that this decision was extremely difficult for the commander-in-chief.

On September 14, Napoleon entered the abandoned and devastated former capital of Russia. During his stay in Moscow, sabotage groups of the Moscow governor Rostopchin repeatedly attacked French officers and burned their captured apartments. As a result, from September 14 to 18, Moscow burned, and Napoleon did not have enough resources to cope with the fire.

At the beginning of the invasion, before the Battle of Borodino, and also three times after the occupation of Moscow, Napoleon tried to come to an agreement with Alexander and sign peace. But from the very beginning of the war, the Russian emperor adamantly prohibited any negotiations while enemy feet trampled Russian soil.

Realizing that it would not be possible to spend the winter in devastated Moscow, on October 19, 1812, the French left Moscow. Napoleon decided to return to Smolensk, but not along the scorched path, but through Kaluga, hoping to get at least some supplies along the way.

In the battle of Tarutino and a little later near Maly Yaroslavets on October 24, Kutuzov repelled the French, and they were forced to return to the devastated Smolensk road along which they had walked earlier.

On November 8, Bonaparte reached Smolensk, which was ruined (half of it by the French themselves). All the way to Smolensk, the emperor constantly lost person after person - up to hundreds of soldiers a day.

During the summer-autumn of 1812, a hitherto unprecedented partisan movement was formed in Russia, leading the war of liberation. Partisan detachments numbered up to several thousand people. They attacked Napoleon's army like Amazonian piranhas attacking a wounded jaguar, waited for convoys with supplies and weapons, and destroyed the vanguards and rearguards of the troops. The most famous leader of these detachments was Denis Davydov. Peasants, workers, and nobles joined the partisan detachments. It is believed that they destroyed more than half of Bonaparte's army. Of course, Kutuzov’s soldiers did not lag behind, they also followed Napoleon on his heels and constantly made forays.

On November 29, a major battle took place on the Berezina, when admirals Chichagov and Wittgenstein, without waiting for Kutuzov, attacked Napoleon’s army and destroyed 21 thousand of his soldiers. However, the emperor was able to escape, with only 9 thousand people left at his disposal. With them he reached Vilna (Vilnius), where his generals Ney and Murat were waiting for him.

On December 14, after Kutuzov’s attack on Vilna, the French lost 20 thousand soldiers and abandoned the city. Napoleon fled to Paris in a hurry, ahead of the remnants of his Great Army. Together with the remnants of the garrison of Vilna and other cities, a little more than 30 thousand Napoleonic warriors left Russia, while at least about 610 thousand invaded Russia.

After the defeat in Russia French Empire started to fall apart. Bonaparte continued to send envoys to Alexander, offering almost all of Poland in exchange for a peace treaty. Nevertheless, the Russian emperor decided to completely rid Europe of dictatorship and tyranny (and these are not big words, but reality) Napoleon Bonaparte.