Who took Berlin in 1945. Battle of Berlin. Summary of the last operation of the Great Patriotic War

Zhukov Georgy Konstantinovich (1896-1974)

In April-May 1945 - Marshal of the Soviet Union, commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front.

He was in a difficult relationship with Marshal Konev, whom during the Berlin operation he perceived as a competitor in the “race for Berlin.”

“A stern, tough business man,” the sergeant characterizes Zhukov. “Eighty kilograms of trained muscles and nerves. A bundle of energy. An ideal, brilliantly tuned mechanism of military thought! Thousands of error-free strategic decisions circulated in his brain with lightning speed. Coverage - capture! Encirclement - defeat! Pincers - forced march! 1.5 thousand tanks to the right! 2 thousand planes to the left! To take the city, it is necessary to “involve” 200 thousand soldiers! He could immediately name the numbers of our losses and the losses of the enemy in any proposed operation. He could, without a doubt, thoughts of sending a million or two to their deaths. He was a military leader of a new type: he ruined people without number, but almost always achieved victorious results. Our great commanders of the old type were even better at ruining millions, but did not particularly think about what would come of it, so "How simply they didn't know how to think. Zhukov is full of energy, he is charged with it, like a Leyden jar, as if electric sparks are pouring out of him."

After the end of the war, Zhukov headed the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (into which the troops of the 1st BF were transformed), as well as the Soviet military administration in Germany. In March 1946, Stalin appointed him to the positions of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense (Stalin himself was the minister). However, already in the summer of 1946, Zhukov was accused of misappropriating a large number of trophies, as well as exaggerating his own merits. He was removed from his posts and sent to command the troops of the Odessa Military District. After Stalin's death he was returned to Moscow. From February 1955 to October 1957 - Minister of Defense of the USSR. He exercised military leadership in the suppression of the anti-communist uprising in Hungary in 1956. At the end of 1957, on Khrushchev’s initiative, he was expelled from the party’s Central Committee, removed from his posts and sent into retirement.

Konev Ivan Stepanovich (1897-1973)

In April-May 1945 - Marshal of the Soviet Union, commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

He dreamed of taking Berlin, ahead of Marshal Zhukov, which he openly admitted: “approving the composition of the groupings and the direction of attacks, Stalin began to mark with a pencil on the map the demarcation line between the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. In the draft directives, this line went through Lübben and further a little south of Berlin. Drawing this line with a pencil, Staley suddenly broke it at the city of Lübben, located about 60 kilometers southeast of Berlin. He broke it and did not lead further.<…>Was there an unspoken call for competition between the fronts in this break in the demarcation line at Lübben? I admit this possibility. In any case, I don’t rule it out. This can be all the more acceptable if we mentally go back to that time and imagine what Berlin was like for us then and what a passionate desire everyone, from soldier to general, felt to see this city with their own eyes, to take possession of it with the power of their weapons. Of course, this was also my passionate desire. I’m not afraid to admit it now. It would be strange to portray oneself in the last months of the war as a person devoid of passions. On the contrary, we were all filled with them then."

After the completion of the Berlin operation, Konev deployed the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front to rush to Prague, where he ended the war.

At the end of the war in 1945-1946. - Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Soviet Forces in Austria and Hungary. In 1946, he replaced Zhukov, who had fallen into disgrace, as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. In 1957, he supported the expulsion of Zhukov from the party Central Committee. During the Berlin crisis of 1961 - Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Berzarin Nikolai Erastovich (1904-1945)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, Commander of the 5th Shock Army of the 1st Belorussian Front. The first Soviet commandant of Berlin.

On April 21, Berzarin's army crossed the Berliner Ring and approached the eastern outskirts of the Reich capital. It fought its way towards the city center through the areas of Lichtenberg and Friedrichshain. On May 1, the advanced detachments of the 5th UA were the first of the Soviet units to reach the Reich Chancellery building, located on Vossstrasse, and took it by storm.

Marshal Zhukov appointed Berzarin as commandant of Berlin on April 24. And already on April 28, when fighting was still in full swing in the city, the general began creating a new administration, issuing Order No. 1 “On the transfer of all power in Berlin to the hands of the Soviet military commandant’s office.” Berzarin did not remain commandant for long. On June 16, 1945, he died in a car accident. Nevertheless, in less than 2 months of his management of the city, he managed to leave a good memory of himself among the Germans. Mainly because he managed to restore public order on the streets and provide the population with food. A square (Bersarinplatz) and a bridge (Nikolai-Bersarin-Brucke) are named in his honor in Berlin.

Bogdanov Semyon Ilyich (1894-1960)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, Commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

On April 21, the 2nd GvTA crossed the Berliner Ring and broke into the northern outskirts of the city. On April 22, the advanced units of the army, having bypassed Berlin from the north, reached the Havel River and crossed it. On April 25, units of the 2nd GvTA and 47th Army (Franz Perkhorovich) linked up west of Berlin with the advanced units of the 4th Guards Tank Army (Dmitry Lelyushenko) of the 1st Ukrainian Front, closing the encirclement ring around the city. Other formations of the 2nd GvTA approached the Berlin-Spandauer-Schiffarts canal on April 23 and crossed it the next day. On April 27, the main forces of the army crossed the Spree, entered the Charlottenburg area and moved southeast towards the Tiergarten. On the morning of May 2, in the Tiergarten area, units of the 2nd GvTA united with units of the 8th Guards Army (Vasily Chuikov) and the 3rd Shock Army (Nikolai Kuznetsov).

After the end of the war, Bogdanov commanded the armored and mechanized forces of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and from December 1948 - the armored and mechanized forces of the entire USSR. In 1956 he was dismissed.

Katukov Mikhail Efimovich (1900-1976)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, Commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Katukov's army attacked Berlin from the south-east, supporting the 8th Guards Army (Vasily Chuikov). She fought in the area of ​​Neukölln and Tempelchow. It advanced in a fairly narrow zone, limited by several streets.

Therefore, it suffered significant losses from enemy artillery and cartridges. On April 28, units of the 1st GvTA reached the Potsdam station area. Since April 29, fighting took place in Tiergarten Park. On May 2, it united there with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov) and the 3rd Shock Army (Vasily Kuznetsov).

After the war, Katukov continued to command his army, which became part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Kuznetsov Vasily Ivanovich (1894-1964)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, Commander of the 3rd Shock Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

On April 21, the 3rd UA crossed the Berliner Ring and entered the northern and northeastern outskirts of Berlin. Passed through the areas of Pankow, Siemensstadt, Charlottenburg, Moabit. Beginning on April 29, units of the 3rd UA stormed the area of ​​government buildings on Königsplatz. On the morning of May 2, we united in Tiergarten with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov) and the 8th Guards Army (Vasily Chuikov).

At the end of the war, Kuznetsov continued to command the 3rd Shock Army, which became part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Lelyushenko Dmitry Danilovich (1901-1987)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, Commander of the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

The 4th GvTA advanced in the direction of Potsdam, covering Berlin from the southwest. On April 23, the army reached the Havel River and captured the southeastern region of Potsdam - Babelsberg. On April 25, units of the 4th GvTA crossed the Havel and west of Berlin joined forces with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov) and the 47th Army (Franz Perkhorovich) of the 1st Belorussian Front, advancing from the north.

Thus, the encirclement ring around the German capital closed. On April 27, the 4th GvTA took Potsdam, and on April 29, Peacock Island on the Havel River. In addition, Lelyushenko’s army had to repel a counterattack by Walter Wenck’s 12th Army on the approaches to Potsdam. Lelyushenko’s army did not have the chance to fight in densely built areas of Berlin, so its losses were lower than those of other armies. On May 4, after the end of the Battle of Berlin, it was sent to Prague.

After the war, Lelyushenko commanded various military districts. Then he was dismissed. In 1960-1964. headed DOSAAF.

Luchinsky Alexander Alexandrovich (1900-1990)

In April-May 1945 - lieutenant general, commander of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Lucinsky's army attacked Berlin from the south. On April 23, she approached the Teltow Canal, and then, together with the 3rd GvTA (Pavel Rybalko), fought in the western part of Berlin.

After the end of World War II in Europe, Lucinsky was sent to the Far East. There he commanded the 36th Army during the war with Japan in August 1945.

Perkhorovich Franz Iosifovich (1894-1961)

In April-May 1945 - Lieutenant General, Commander of the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

During the Berlin operation, the 47th Army captured Berlin from the northwest and occupied the urban area of ​​Spandau. On April 25, west of Berlin, together with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov), it united with the 4th Guards Tank Army (Dmitry Lelyushenko) of the 1st Ukrainian Front, closing the encirclement ring around the German capital. On April 30, in front of the forces of the 47th Army, the Spandau citadel.

After the war, Perkhorovich continued to command his army. Since 1947, he headed the department at the General Staff of the Ground Forces. In 1951 he was dismissed.

Rybalko Pavel Semenovich (1894-1948)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, Commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Rybalko’s army was attacking Berlin from the south. By April 22, she reached the Teltow Canal. On April 24, she crossed it and entered the areas of Zehlendorf and Dahlem. Then she fought in Schöneberg and Wilmensdorf.

After the war, Rybalko continued to command his army. In 1947, he was appointed commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the USSR.

Chuikov Vasily Ivanovich (1900-1982)

In April-May 1945 - Colonel General, Commander of the 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

He became widely known during the Battle of Stalingrad. His 62nd Army (renamed the 8th Guards Army after the battles of Stalingrad) fought fierce street battles in the city for several months. The experience of such battles was very useful to her during the storming of Berlin.

The 8th Guards Army attacked the capital of the Reich from the eastern and southeastern directions with the support of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Mikhail Katukov). With battles it occupied the areas of Berlin Neukölln and Tempelhof. On April 28, the 8th GvA reached the southern bank of the Landwehr Canal and reached the Anhalt station. On April 30, Chuikov’s advanced units were 800 meters from the Reich Chancellery. On May 1, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General Hans Krebs, came to Chuikov’s headquarters and reported Hitler’s suicide and conveyed Goebbels and Bormann’s proposal for a temporary ceasefire. On the morning of May 2, in the Tiergarten area, the 8th Guards Army united with units of the 3rd Shock Army (Nikolai Kuznetsov) and the 2nd Guards Tank Army (Semyon Bogdanov). That same morning, at Chuikov’s headquarters, General Helmut Weidling wrote an order for the surrender of the Berlin garrison.

After the war, Chuikov continued to command his army. In 1949-1953 was commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. Under Khrushchev he became a marshal (1955), and in 1960-1964. served as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR (1960-1964).

Berlin in 1945 was the largest city of the Reich and its center. Here were the headquarters of the commander-in-chief, the Reich Chancellery, the headquarters of most armies and many other administrative buildings. By spring, Berlin was home to more than 3 million residents and about 300 thousand deported civilians from the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The entire top of Nazi Germany remained here: Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels, Goering and others.

Preparing the operation

The Soviet leadership planned to take the city at the end of the Berlin offensive. This task was assigned to the troops of the 1st Ukrainian and Belorussian fronts. At the end of April, the advanced units met, the city was besieged.
The USSR allies refused to participate in the operation. Berlin in 1945 represented an extremely important strategic goal. In addition, the fall of the city would invariably lead to a victory in propaganda terms. The Americans developed a plan for the assault back in 1944. After consolidating the troops in Normandy, it was planned to make a rush north to the Ruhr and begin an attack on the city. But in September the Americans suffered huge losses in Holland and abandoned the operation.
Soviet troops on both fronts had more than 2 million manpower and about 6 thousand tanks. Of course, all of them could not participate in the assault. 460 thousand people were concentrated for the strike, and Polish formations also took part.

City defense

The defense of Berlin in 1945 was prepared very carefully. The garrison numbered over 200 thousand people. It is quite difficult to give an exact figure, since the civilian population was actively involved in the defense of the Nazi capital. The city was surrounded by several lines of defense. Every building was turned into a fortress. Barricades were built on the streets. Almost the entire population was obliged to take part in the construction of engineering structures. Concrete bunkers were hastily installed on the approaches to the city.

Offensive

Berlin in 1945 had already been under regular bombing for several months. In 1944, raids by the British and Americans became more frequent. Before this, in 1941, on the personal orders of Stalin, a number of secret operations were carried out by Soviet aviation, as a result of which a number of bombs were dropped on the city.
On April 25, massive artillery preparation began. Soviet aviation ruthlessly suppressed firing points. Howitzers, mortars, and MLRS hit Berlin with direct fire. On April 26, the fiercest fighting of the entire war began in the city. For the Red Army, the density of the city's buildings was a huge problem. It was extremely difficult to advance due to the abundance of barricades and dense fire.
Large losses in armored vehicles were caused by many Volkssturm anti-tank groups. To take one city block, it was first treated with artillery.

The fire stopped only when the infantry approached the German positions. Then the tanks destroyed the stone buildings blocking the path, and the Red Army moved on.

Liberation of Berlin (1945)

Marshal Zhukov ordered to use the experience of the Stalingrad battles. In a similar situation, Soviet troops successfully used small mobile groups. Several armored vehicles, a group of sappers, mortarmen and artillerymen were attached to the infantry. Also, sometimes flamethrowers were included in such a unit. They were needed to destroy the enemy hidden in underground communications.
The rapid advance of Soviet troops led to the encirclement of the Reichstag area within 3 days after the start of active fighting. 5 thousand Nazis concentrated in a small area in the city center. A ditch was dug around the building, making a tank breakthrough impossible. All available artillery fired at the building. On April 30, shells breached the Reichstag. At 14:25 a red flag was raised over the buildings.

The photograph that captured this moment would later become one of

The Fall of Berlin (1945)

After the capture of the Reichstag, the Germans began to flee en masse. Chief of the General Staff Krebs requested a ceasefire. Zhukov conveyed the proposal of the German side personally to Stalin. The commander-in-chief demanded only the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. The Germans rejected such an ultimatum. Immediately after this, heavy fire fell on Berlin. The fighting continued for several more days, as a result of which the Nazis were finally defeated and ended in Europe. in Berlin in 1945 showed the whole world the power of the liberating Red Army and the Soviet people. The capture of the Nazi lair has forever remained one of the most important moments in the history of mankind.

STORM OF BERLIN

The last operation of the Great Patriotic War, upon closer examination, turns into a real tangle of mysteries and contradictions, and the threads from this tangle stretch both into the distant future and into the past. Within the framework of historical alternatives, we need to consider several basic issues. Was it necessary to storm Berlin at all? If it is still necessary, then when and how should it be done? To find answers to these questions, we will have to consider the background of the assault, and this consideration will not begin at Stalin's Headquarters, but at the headquarters of General Eisenhower.

The fact is that of all the big three, Winston Churchill thought more about politics and the post-war structure of Europe than Roosevelt and Stalin combined. It was he who constantly rushed around with various ideas that contradicted the preliminary agreements. Either he wanted to land in the Balkans in order to cut off the Red Army’s path to Central Europe, or he wanted to capture Berlin... This is something worth talking about. At Churchill's instigation, Field Marshal Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, began to consider

options for a rapid rush of British troops to Berlin, although plans for such operations were not seriously developed. And there was no one to command the rapid rush. The British commander, Field Marshal Montgomery, was known for his pathological methodicalness and complete inability to make swift decisions and actions. Now, if Churchill had decided to talk to the American General Patton, then, you see, history could have taken a different path. By the way, here is another possible alternative for you - an attempt by the Allies to capture Berlin.

However, the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in Europe, General Eisenhower, refused to even consider such adventures. However, rumors about the intentions of the British could well have reached Stalin, and then his reaction would have been completely easy to predict. Let's take Berlin! Alas, the former seminarian was not organically capable of anything more reasonable. After this, the next question inevitably arose: how to take it? And here we are simply forced to consider in more detail the events immediately preceding the Berlin operation, or more precisely, the Vistula-Oder operation of the Red Army.

This operation is remarkable in many respects. First of all, few people thought about it, but the possibility cannot be ruled out that it was the course of the battles between the Vistula and Oder rivers and their results that once and for all discouraged the Allies from getting involved with the Soviet Union. It is not for nothing that the Anglo-American warriors based all their subsequent calculations solely on the use of some kind of miracle weapon that would help them defeat the damned Bolsheviks, but at the same time they did not even mention starting a conventional war. The Vistula-Oder operation showed in all its splendor the real power of the Red Army and its main striking force - tank troops. Moreover, the fact that during the operation the commanders, to put it delicately, did not shine with fresh ideas, made its results especially convincing. It was a monstrous force that crushed the vaunted Wehrmacht like a road roller crushing a rag doll.

Since the events of 1945 had several opportunities to turn onto an alternative track, we are simply forced to abandon the usual chapter structure: introduction and then alternative. Now we will highlight alternative scenarios in italics, since we will have to return to reality again and again.

The strategic situation before the start of the Vistula-Oder operation was crystal clear. The Red Army had three bridgeheads across the Vistula, and attacks were to be expected from them. In any case, the famous German historian and former general Tippelskirch writes that the German command foresaw this, but simply did not have enough strength to parry these attacks. I don’t know, I don’t know... If you remember the Battle of Stalingrad, the places where decisive blows would be delivered and the prospect of encircling Paulus’s army were also completely obvious, but for some reason none of the German generals had an insight. But about “not enough” Tippel-Skirch is absolutely right. Although even here he cannot resist telling a fable about the “tenfold” superiority of the Red Army in manpower. Apparently, the general had certain problems with arithmetic - a common disease of beaten commanders. If our generals in 1941 counted that the Germans had “three times more tanks,” then now it is the Germans’ turn to do multiplication and division. The number of German troops at Tippel-Skirch was well known, and if you believe his calculations, it turns out that everything that the Red Army had on the Eastern Front was collected against the unfortunate Army Group “A”. A heated scientific dispute even broke out between Tippelskirch and General von Buttlar: was our army 10 or 11 times superior to theirs?

In tanks, we had a sevenfold superiority, what was, was. But who is to blame for this? Who prevented the Germans from developing their industry at full speed? I have already written more than once that such excuses are simply pathetic evasions. This is the art of a commander, to concentrate superior forces in a decisive place at a decisive moment. And if the state and industry can give it these superior forces, this fact only speaks of the advantages of this state and that one should not try to fight with it.

However, not everything is clean with our history. Just look at the statement of the Military Encyclopedia about the 500-kilometer depth of the German defensive structures between the Vistula and Oder. It immediately becomes clear why they did not have enough tanks: all of Germany was digging trenches and trenches day and night. True, if you believe the map placed in the same second volume of the SVE, with all the efforts between the Vistula and Oder it is impossible to measure more than 350 kilometers of distance. Maybe our General Staff measured the distance from the lower reaches of the Oder to the upper reaches of the Vistula? Then it may turn out even more.

But distances played a role in this operation. During World War II, the maximum depth of operations was determined by the presence or absence of a supply system for the attacking troops. But even the Americans, who had a simply fantastic amount of vehicles, could not afford to go beyond certain limits. For example, the Germans have written more than once that it was supply problems that ultimately destroyed Paulus’s army at Stalingrad and the German troops in the North Caucasus. The most curious thing is that in this case they are not so wrong. It was the Americans who could afford to send supplies for the XIV Air Force to China along a risky route through the Himalayas, spending four tons of gasoline to deliver a fifth to General Chennall's planes. But not more! Even they could not supply the advancing armies of Patton and Bradley in this way. Therefore, almost all armies, after a breakthrough of about 500 kilometers, were forced to stop to regroup and pull up their rear, even if there was no enemy resistance in principle.

However, let’s return to January 1945 on the banks of the Vistula. For one reason or another, the Soviet offensive began on January 12. The 1st Belorussian Front of Marshal Zhukov launched strikes from the Magnuszewski and Pulawy bridgeheads, and the 1st Ukrainian Front of Marshal Konev launched one, but much more powerful, attack from the Sandomierz bridgehead. The force of this blow can be easily imagined if we remember that 8 combined arms and 2 tank armies, as well as 3 separate tank corps, took part in it. It is pleasant and easy to describe such operations. There are no sophisticated maneuvers, no subtle plans in them. The main idea can be characterized in two words: pace and power!

The troops of Marshal Konev were the first to go on the offensive, and the Sandomierz-Silesian operation began. The breakthrough was carried out within a 40-kilometer strip by the forces of three armies. The front troops had a deep operational formation, but at the same time, in the breakthrough sector, even in the first zone, Konev created an overwhelming superiority over the enemy. In total, almost 12,000 guns and more than 1,400 tanks were concentrated on the Sandomierz bridgehead, and all this force fell on the German XLVIII Panzer Corps. After a powerful artillery barrage, the infantry went on the attack, and after a couple of hours the main line of enemy defense was broken through. In the afternoon, the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies were thrown into battle, and the German defense simply fell apart.

Where were the German reserves at this time? Here we have Hitler to thank. Almost all the generals write that, at his request, the reserves were located close to the front line, so they came under artillery fire and bomb attacks and were pretty battered by the time they should have gone into battle. But only Guderian reveals another little secret. Army Group A had only 12 tank and mechanized divisions at its disposal. However, they were all evenly distributed along the front line. The Germans did not create a single shock fist. Who ordered this? Not known. However, Guderian, apparently retaining some shreds of honesty, in this case does not try to blame Hitler, from which we can conclude that either the German General Staff or someone in the High Command tried.

Two days later, the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. And here we are faced with the first of the mysteries of the Vistula-Oder operation. The configuration of the front simply suggested the idea of ​​encircling the LVI tank and XL1I army corps of the Germans, who were already in the bag, with simultaneous attacks from the Magnushevsky and Sandomierz bridgeheads. Another small alternative. However, this did not happen. Why? Maybe, after all, the stories about, to put it mildly, not the best relations between Zhukov and Konev are not without foundation? After all, both fronts did not even try to create another cauldron, but rushed together to the west, as if not noticing each other. Moreover, Zhukov’s 69th Army, with a blow from the Pulawy bridgehead, threw the Germans out of the cauldron, which could have arisen by itself, even against the will of the commanders. What was the point of the offensive from a tiny patch of the Puławy bridgehead is not clear, because this offensive had no tactical or operational significance. Although, on the other hand, both commanders were not seen making brilliant decisions, and no matter how hard A. Isaev tries to promote Zhukov, if you carefully read everything he wrote, Isaev’s books prove the complete mediocrity of the marshals.

Organized German resistance ceased on the second day of fighting, and the offensive entered the pursuit stage. This may also partly explain the abandonment of attempts to create an encirclement ring. Why waste time on cunning maneuvers if you can use the second advantage of tank forces - striking power? But even this had to be used skillfully. The heavy roller of a tank army may well turn into a thin pancake all the divisions that find themselves in its path, you just need to aim it correctly and ensure the possibility of linear and non-stop movement. But our generals constantly had problems with this. By the way, straightforwardness still had a right to exist. If we compare the composition of the German 9th Army, which took the main blow, at the beginning of January and the end of the same month, it turns out that not a single one of the originally listed divisions remained in it. Everything that came under the frontal attack of Zhukov and Konev died.

Hitler, naturally, blamed his generals for everything and began feverishly shuffling the commanders of armies and corps. The first to fly from his post was the commander of Army Group A, General Oberst Harpe, followed by other generals. It seems that in January 1945, all the commanders of the army groups and armies operating in Poland were replaced, but it was impossible to correct the situation.

The offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front began on January 14 and at first did not develop so successfully. The advance on the first day of the offensive was no more than 3 kilometers, but then the Germans simply could not stand it. As we already mentioned, they did not have enough forces on the front line or reserves. After the destruction of the main forces of the 9th Army, Zhukov’s tanks also rushed further. Finally, our tankers stopped looking up to the infantry divisions and began to act independently. They were 30-50 kilometers ahead of the infantry divisions, at times this gap could reach 100 kilometers, and then the actions of Guderian and Rommel are immediately remembered.

Our historians somehow do not notice this, but the same Guderian admits that around September 19, the German front in Poland ceased to exist, as it did last year in Belarus. The task set by the operation plan to reach the line Zychlin - Lodz - Radomsko - Częstochowa - Miechow was completed on the sixth day instead of the twelfth as planned. At the same time, the line of advance of both fronts gradually deviated north into Pomerania. If you look at the map, you can see some parallels with Operation Gelb. In the same way, a large group of enemy troops located in East Prussia was cut off. The only difference was that the Germans did not line up on the parade ground to lay down their arms in an organized manner, but tried to fight back.

But here a new portion of incomprehensible moments begins. The 1st Belorussian Front finally turns north and, instead of moving towards Berlin, breaks into Pomerania. There is a formal explanation for this. The Germans created a shock (allegedly) group here that threatened the flank of the front, and it was necessary to defeat it first. But even General Routh himself, who commanded this parody offensive, honestly writes that he had no forces. Do you catch the subtlety? Not “not enough,” but “none at all.” His own words: “10 divisions with 70 tanks.” Against such a background, even the newly formed Clausewitz tank division, which had, scary to think, as many as 12 tanks and 20 self-propelled guns, looks menacing. There is one good example of the effectiveness of such counterattacks. Tippel-Skirch and von Buttlar write about the attempt of the German 4th Army to jump out of East Prussia. But look carefully at all our publications, starting with the same old SVE and ending with the completely modern issues of Front-line Illustration. There is not a word about this “breakthrough” anywhere. It is not reflected on any map. History, as we have said more than once, loves evil things. In 1941, the Germans did not even suspect that they were participating in the great tank battle of Rovno and Brody, and in 1945, Zhukov and Rokossovsky, without noticing it themselves, repelled the attack of General Hossbach's divisions. So such an explanation should be considered precisely as formal.

As a last resort, the German command renamed Army Group Center to Army Group North, and Army Group A was given the name Army Group Center. But even this did not help stop the Soviet tanks.

Meanwhile, the all-crushing wave of Soviet tanks continued to roll towards the Oder. The 1st Belorussian Front crossed the Warta River, bypassed the city of Poznan, which was declared another “festung,” and continued the offensive, although now only the 1st Guards Tank Army remained its vanguard. By the way, here is an excerpt from the memoirs of the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, which best characterizes the change in the views of Soviet commanders and the doctrine of the Red Army: “On the fifth day of the offensive, the 11th Guards Corps of A. Kh. Babajanyan, having fought about 200 kilometers, approached the Warta River - the sixth line of German defense. In the place where Gusakovsky’s advanced brigade reached, the Varta flowed strictly north. Then, near the city of Kolo, it turned sharply to the west and, having reached the Poznan meridian, again headed north. I ordered Babajanyan and Dremov to bypass the enemy reserves concentrated in the eastern bend of the river and take the Poznan-Warsaw highway in pincers. Having crossed the Warta and leaving the German group on the flank across the river, both corps rushed to Poznan. Under these conditions, the enemy group was doomed to inaction. She could no longer prevent the further advance of our troops.”

Notice the end of the quote. If only our tank generals had acted like this in 1944, without getting involved in the destruction of every isolated strong point!

Already on January 22-23, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front reached the Oder and crossed it in a number of areas. But this front also lost one of its tank armies, which had to turn south to decide the outcome of the battles in Silesia and around Krakow. By February 3, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front also reached the Oder in the Küstrin area. They also crossed the river and created a small bridgehead. The Oder also did not become a serious obstacle for Katukov’s tankers.

This is what the army commander wrote: “The brigade commanders decided to cross the river together. They pulled self-propelled guns, rocket launchers and all other artillery to the shore. After a massive fire strike on enemy positions on the opposite bank, chains of motorized riflemen descended onto the ice. Having quickly crossed the river, they, with the support of artillery from the eastern bank, knocked down small barriers of the Nazis and captured a bridgehead 5 kilometers along the front and 4 kilometers in depth. Motorized rifle battalions reached the Reitwein - Wooden line.

Having received a message that Gusakovsky and Fedorovich crossed the Oder, I ordered A. Kh. Babajanyan to transfer all the forces of the corps to help the forward detachments, establish crossings and expand the bridgehead. But only seven tanks from Gusakovsky’s brigade managed to cross the ferry crossing to the bridgehead. The fact is that I received a new order: the army was transferred to Eastern Pomerania, to the area north of the city of Landsberg (Gurovo-Ilawecke). She was given a new task.”

This ended the Vistula-Oder operation, which became one of the largest in scope during the entire war. As we have already said, it fully demonstrated the qualities of tank forces that Fuller, Liddell-Hart, Tukhachevsky and others dreamed of before the war. Mobility allowed tanks to cover distances unimaginable for foot armies, and firepower and armor made resistance attempts by rear units and modest reserves collected from the pine forest pointless. The steel roller crushed everything that came in its way. The infantry could only reap the benefits of the victories of the tankers and engage in the elimination of scattered centers of resistance such as Poznan, Schneidemühl and the like. The main issue remained providing the advancing tank corps with all the necessary supplies and, first of all, fuel.

This is where we come to the most interesting issue of the Vistula-Oder operation, its alternative option. Was it possible, without stopping, to continue the offensive further directly towards Berlin? After all, this would allow us to avoid bloody battles for the Seelow Heights and protracted battles in the city itself. Alas, a rather categorical answer should be given here: “No!” First of all, during the operation, Soviet troops advanced deep into enemy territory to a distance of about 400 kilometers, which was the limit for the army supply systems of that time. Even the Wehrmacht, in the ideal conditions of the blitzkriegs of 1940-1941, made stops in such cases to put the troops in order and tighten up the rear. And the rear services of the Red Army, unfortunately, even at the very end of the war did not at all resemble a well-oiled machine. Moreover, as we have seen, the offensive has lost its penetrating power. Two tank armies were diverted to other directions, and the two that reached the Oder suffered some losses and, accordingly, did not have the same power. Therefore, to make a leap another 100 kilometers and start fighting in Berlin itself was clearly beyond their capabilities.

And yet one “but” remains. Reading Katukov’s memoirs, it is impossible to escape the impression that his army and the army of General Badanov, after crossing the Oder, could have advanced a little further. After all, the width of the Seelow Heights is small, no more than 10 kilometers. At that time, there was simply no one to defend this line. Let me remind you that the 9th Army, which occupied this section of the front, the Germans had to form anew, all its divisions to the last were killed on the Vistula, and it could not provide any serious resistance. In fact, it is impossible to find anything like this in the history of war: in three weeks the composition of the entire army completely changed!

Therefore, if generals Katukov and Badanov had advanced only 15-20 kilometers further, even later handing over their sectors to the approaching infantry armies, we would have had a full-fledged bridgehead at our disposal, and not the Kyustrin patch, and the Germans would have lost their main line of defense. By the way, Zhukov understood all this, because in an order dated February 4 he demanded that the 5th Shock Army expand the bridgehead to 20 kilometers along the front and to 10 kilometers in depth. The task was made easier by the fact that the command of the German troops at the Oder line was entrusted to the great commander Heinrich Himmler. In addition, it was during these days that Hitler launched the Balaton operation, after which the Panzerwaffe finally ceased to exist. But the main thing was done - the last remnants of German tank units and formations were tied up on another sector of the front, and the Germans could not oppose anything to the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies.

If the Seelow Heights had been occupied by an attack on the move, the Germans simply had nothing with which to repel them. The state of the German troops at that moment is best characterized by the same Guderian: “On January 26, Hitler ordered the formation of a tank destroyer division. The name of this new compound sounded beautiful and promising. But there was nothing more. In reality, this formation should have consisted of companies of scooters under the command of brave lieutenants; The crews of these companies armed with Faustpatrons were supposed to destroy G-34s and heavy Russian tanks. The division was brought into battle in squadrons. It was a pity for the brave soldiers!” Apparently, the Fuhrer was greatly impressed by the actions of the Soviet tank armies if he gave such an order. But such improvised formations were, as they say, “one toe for the Soviet armies.” We will not even consider the German attempts to recapture the Seelow Heights, we will simply give a small excerpt from the list of the 9th Army on January 26, that is, after the end of the Vistula-Oder operation: 608th Special Division Headquarters; remnants of the 19th Panzer Division; remnants of the 25th Panzer Division; Well, there are some other little things there.

That is, the Soviet command had a real opportunity to occupy the Seelow Heights and freely obtain an excellent starting position for the subsequent assault on Berlin and avoid the colossal problems and losses that took place in reality. In addition, the opportunity arose after regrouping to strike directly at Berlin instead of a large-scale operation to encircle the capital of the Reich. Probably, in this case the war would have ended a month and a half earlier. It may seem like a small amount, but it still means thousands of soldiers’ lives.

After this, we come to the second fork in the spring of 1945 - the Berlin offensive operation of the Red Army. What was she? A golden exclamation point that crowned the most difficult war in the history of our country? Or a bloody blot that casts a dark shadow over the entire victory? Like any grandiose historical event, the assault and capture of Berlin cannot be assessed unambiguously.

Everyone understood the importance of the Küstrin bridgehead, even the Fuhrer. He therefore ordered General Busse's revived 9th Army to eliminate him. In February and March, Busse carried out a series of attacks, but their only result was the loss of 35,000 people, whom he never received again. During these attacks, one of the Vlasov divisions particularly distinguished itself, and Heinrich Himmler awarded the Iron Crosses to these warriors. Of course, there was no point in expecting that Hitler himself would reward the traitors. Thus, even before the start of the decisive battles, the German forces in the main direction were weakened. After this, Busse decided to hold the city of Küstrin itself, which blocked the direct road to Berlin, at any cost. It separated two Soviet bridgeheads, at Reitwein and Kienitz, and was a real bone in the throat of the 1st Belorussian Front. However, the Germans did not succeed in this either; on March 30, the city fell. The Soviet armies consolidated the bridgehead and could calmly prepare a decisive offensive.

But it didn’t work out calmly. Here we will completely unwittingly have to enter into a small polemic with A. Isaev, or more precisely, with his book “Georgy Zhukov. The King's Last Argument." By the way, a very interesting name. Without a doubt, the enlightened public knows the historical roots of this curious phrase, although for some reason the author did not consider it possible to decipher them, at least in the preface. But I do not exclude at all the possibility that he also knows the beautiful-sounding Latin original “Ultima ratio regis”, and he may well know that this inscription was on the barrels of the cannons of the most Christian kings of France, Louis, with rather large numbers. So whose gun should we consider Marshal Zhukov to be?

However, certain doubts still arise. When you criticize and expose others, you should be more precise yourself. The simplest example. Isaev writes that Zhukov’s troops were the first to reach the Oder, although in fact Konev was a couple of days ahead of him. And so on. By the way, Zhukov himself was never an artilleryman, so where is the connection here? On the other hand, this motto perfectly describes Zhukov’s manner of communicating with the outside world, so the name is quite appropriate.

However, we digress a little, let’s return to the events at the Seelow Heights. The roots of Zhukov’s more than controversial decisions should still be sought in his hostile relationship with Konev and his desire to please Stalin. To talk about some kind of socialist competition to capture the Reichstag is, of course, stupid, here I agree 150 percent with Isaev. But there was rivalry, and in addition to completely natural reasons (jealousy of a neighbor’s successes has always existed and will remain forever and ever), there was another one, artificially introduced. I don’t know for what purpose Stalin tried to pit the two marshals against each other before the start of the decisive offensive, but he did it. Let us turn to the memoirs of Zhukov himself, in which he describes the meetings at Headquarters preceding the Berlin operation:

"He's right there<Сталин>said to Marshal I. S. Konev:

“In the event of stubborn enemy resistance on the eastern approaches to Berlin, which will certainly happen, and a possible delay in the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front, the 1st Ukrainian Front should be ready to strike with tank armies from the south towards Berlin.”

There are misconceptions that

The 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies were introduced into the battle for Berlin, allegedly not by the decision of J.V. Stalin, but on the initiative of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front. In order to restore the truth, I will quote the words of Marshal I. S. Konev on this issue, which he said at a meeting of the senior command staff of the central group of forces on February 18, 1946, when everything was still so fresh in memory:

“When, at about 24 hours on April 16, I reported that the offensive was going well, Comrade Stalin gave the following instructions: “It’s going hard at Zhukov, turn Rybalko and Lelyushenko to Zehlendorf, remember how we agreed at Headquarters.”

Therefore, the maneuver that Rybalko and Lelyushenko performed is a direct order from Comrade Stalin. Consequently, all fabrications on this issue should be excluded from our literature.”

That is, the notorious race was organized by order from above. What, after Stalin’s direct order to turn the tank armies to Berlin, will Konev voluntarily give up the opportunity to be the first to capture the same Reichstag? In addition, there was another race with an imaginary opponent. But the assumption that the Soviet command was in a hurry to capture Berlin before the Allies should be discarded. After all, the plan of the operation provided for the encirclement of Berlin. Will the British or Americans really begin to fight their way to Berlin, breaking through the positions of Soviet troops?! Well, this is complete nonsense, you will agree. But we will return to the question of the storming of Berlin later.

Let us remember: Stalin had every reason to expect that the assault on Berlin would not be delayed. The Red Army had an overwhelming superiority in manpower and equipment. As usual, one should not believe either the SVE, which writes about a two- or four-fold superiority, or the memoirs of German generals, which tell tales of a twenty-fold superiority. The truth, as always, lies in the middle.

But there are many nuances that are quite capable of changing these ratios. As already noted, the entire first part of the German 9th Army, defending in the Berlin direction, died during the Vistula-Oder operation, and in front of the 1st Belorussian Front in March there were motley formations hastily assembled everywhere. By the beginning of the Berlin operation, the composition of the army had changed again, and again entirely! 9th Army December 31, 1944, January 26, March 1 and April 12, 1945 - these are four completely different armies! You yourself understand that in such a situation there can be no talk of any normal interaction of compounds. And so it happened.

The operation plan developed by Headquarters was very optimistic. On the very first day, it was planned to break through the German defenses on the Seelow Heights and introduce the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies into the breakthrough. Berlin was scheduled to be taken on the sixth day of the operation, and by the eleventh day the 3rd Shock Army was heading to the Elbe to meet with the Americans.

Marshal Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front attacked in the direction of Brandenburg, Rathenow and Dessau. In the same way, immediately after the breakthrough of the German defense, the 3rd and 4th tank armies entered the operational space. Moreover, it was initially assumed that one of the corps of General Rybalko’s 3rd Guards Tank Army was supposed to attack Berlin from the south. But there was an option in which both Konev’s tank armies could be sent to Berlin.

Moreover, this is written by SVE, and if Isaev intended to refute a certain myth, then it was necessary to do this in more detail.

Solved an auxiliary, but very important problem

2nd Belorussian Front of Marshal Rokossovsky. He was supposed to advance in the Stettin-Swedge area and defeat the German 3rd Tank Army, which, naturally, would not allow it to move its forces to help Berlin.

The offensive began early in the morning of April 16. After a 30-minute artillery barrage, 140 powerful anti-aircraft searchlights were turned on, which were supposed to blind the Germans. It looked very nice in the movie Deliverance, but in reality it did more harm than good. A word from Marshal Chuikov: “I must say that at the time when we admired the power and efficiency of the searchlights at the training ground, none of us could accurately predict what it would look like in a combat situation. It is difficult for me to judge the situation on other sectors of the front. But in the zone of our 8th Guards Army, I saw how powerful beams of light from searchlights rested on a swirling curtain of burning, smoke and dust raised above the enemy’s positions. Even searchlights could not penetrate this curtain, and it was difficult for us to observe the battlefield. As luck would have it, the wind was also blowing in the opposite direction. As a result, height 81.5, where the command post was located, was soon shrouded in impenetrable darkness. Then we stopped seeing anything at all, relying only on radiotelephone communications and messengers to control the troops.”

The infantry and some tanks advanced about 2 kilometers, after which the offensive stalled. The artillery strike was carried out on the first line of defense that the Germans had left, and now the Soviet troops had to storm the heights themselves, which were almost untouched by the artillery barrage.

“German prisoners could also see huge columns of Soviet equipment waiting for the troops of Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army and Berzarin’s 5th Shock Army to open the way to the west for them. However, there was very little progress that day. At his observation post, Zhukov began to lose patience. He urged the commanders on, threatening to remove them from their positions and send them to a penal company. General Chuikov also got it. Its units were stuck in a swamp in front of German positions located on a hill.”

And then Zhukov makes the most controversial of his decisions. Isaev is trying to present the matter as if both Zhukov and Konev made all changes to the strategic plans on their own initiative. Well, don't! All these changes were made only after consultation with Headquarters and approval by Stalin. The front commander could decide where and how to use the corps subordinate to him, but he could never turn several armies in a different direction! Actually, Zhukov himself writes about this, and, if you believe this passage, he is misleading Stalin just in case.

Zhukov: “At 15 o’clock I called Headquarters and reported that we had broken through the first and second positions of the enemy’s defense, the front troops advanced up to six kilometers, but met serious resistance at the line of the Seelow Heights, where, apparently, the enemy’s defenses had mostly survived. To strengthen the impact of the combined arms armies, I brought both tank armies into the battle. I believe that by the end of the day tomorrow we will break through the enemy’s defenses.”

His troops did not advance 6 kilometers and did not break through the second line of defense. This is where the January delay before the Seelow Heights came back to haunt us! Moreover, in the same conversation, Stalin thinks out loud about whether it is worth turning Konev’s army towards Berlin. Please note that Zhukov writes about all this, not Konev. And the marshal decides to break through the defenses at any cost, throwing the tank armies of Katukov and Bogdanov into battle. Apparently, Zhukov did not learn the lessons of the Battle of Kursk. Tank formations can break through prepared defenses, but only at the cost of absolutely monstrous losses, especially since the German anti-tank weapon-45 was better than the Soviet weapon-43.

General Katukov writes: “The rest of the day did not bring joyful messages. With great difficulty, suffering heavy losses, the tankers bit into the enemy’s defenses and did not advance beyond the positions occupied by the infantry. It wasn’t easy for V.I. Chuikov’s rifle divisions, with whom the tank corps commanders worked closely.”

On the same day, a second conversation took place with Stalin, in which Zhukov promised to break through the defenses on the Seelow Heights at any cost, and immediately the Headquarters encouraged him, informing him of the order for Konev to attack Berlin from the south, and Rokossovsky from the north. I repeat once again, so as not to be biased, I am presenting all this exclusively from the memoirs of Zhukov himself. Actually, strictly speaking, it turns out that Headquarters approved Zhukov’s decision and thus absolved him of some of the blame.

One way or another, in the afternoon of April 16, a tank battle began, which continued the next day. All this was very much reminiscent of Montgomery’s actions at El Alamein, when he pushed through the German front in the same way. He didn’t break through, but rather pushed through. Only on April 19, the Germans could not withstand the onslaught and began to retreat to Berlin. During these days, according to German data, more than 700 Soviet tanks were burned. Whether this is true or not - the question remains open. But even the book “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed” reports that during the Berlin Operation the Red Army lost about 2000 tanks. That is, during the assault on the Seelow Heights, Zhukov gave a textbook example of the improper use of tanks.

Reluctantly, he is forced to admit: “The offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed at a faster pace from the very first day. As expected, the enemy’s defenses in the direction of his attack were weak, which made it possible to bring both tank armies into action there on the morning of April 17. On the very first day they advanced 20-25 kilometers, crossed the Spree River and on the morning of April 19 began to advance to Zossen and Luckenwalde.”

And now it is simply absolutely necessary to say a few words about what Konev supposedly had to do, linking his main forces to this task, so that, God forbid, they would not decide to attack Berlin. We are talking about the liquidation of the so-called Frankfurt-Guben enemy group. What was she like? These were the remnants of the once again defeated 9th Army, which was joined by separate units

4th Tank Army. Dedicating the forces of an entire front to destroy them was, to put it mildly, unreasonable. In addition, Busse saw a categorical order from General: to hold the front on the Oder. Of course, at that time Konev could not have known about this order, but he saw very well that the Germans were not trying to move towards Berlin. Later, Busse received a new order: to retreat west to join General Wenck's 12th Army to liberate Berlin. I highly recommend paying attention to this interesting formulation. That is, General Busse did not have the strength at his disposal to somehow really threaten Konev’s front; one could not even dream of a breakthrough to Berlin in such conditions. He had no order to retreat to Berlin, and everyone knew very well what they did with those who violated orders in the last days of the Reich’s existence. For example, General Weidling, commander of the LVI Tank Corps, who suffered the main blow of Zhukov, was sentenced to death for not holding his position, but, however, he was also pardoned. Did Theodor Busse need such adventures? His path to Berlin was blocked only by the 40th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Army, but this was enough. So Konev correctly decided not to fight the ghosts, allocated a couple of corps to block the German group stuck in the forests and lakes, and went to Berlin.

At 12 noon on April 25, west of Berlin, the advanced units of the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front met with units of the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front. On the same day, another significant event occurred. An hour and a half later, on the Elbe, the 34th Guards Corps of General Baklanov of the 5th Guards Army met with American troops.

It is here that we get another historical fork in the road. There was no longer any danger of the Western Allies reaching Berlin. The breakthrough of German troops to the capital also looked like a complete chimera. So was it necessary to storm the city? It was entirely possible to limit ourselves to what Hitler intended to do with Leningrad: a tight blockade, constant artillery shelling and air bombing. Well, the situation with the latter was not very good; Soviet aviation did not have the ability to deliver powerful strikes due to the lack of strategic bombers. But the artillery of the Red Army has always been the subject of envy and hatred of both enemies and allies. Moreover, April 20 was marked by an artillery strike on Berlin, delivered by long-range artillery of the 79th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army. The Red Army gave the Fuhrer a birthday present.

But in this case we will be forced to give a negative answer. It was necessary to storm Berlin, although not at all for the reasons that were voiced

Soviet historiography. It's just that the process of slowly strangling such a huge city would take too long. Civilian casualties? Sorry, this is war, and it was not the Soviet army that invaded Germany in 1941, but quite the opposite. After all, the Germans themselves came up with the concept of "Kriegsraison" - "Military necessity" which always and unconditionally prevails over "Kriegsmanier" - "Method of warfare."

The strangulation of Berlin led to an unjustifiable prolongation of the war, because Hitler should not have even dreamed of any surrender, unless his own guards would have crushed him in the bunker like a rat... And it is likely that there would have been protests from the Western allies about “unjustified sacrifices” " Of course, one could remind them about the bombings of Hamburg and Dresden, but there was no point in starting political discussions. Not the time and not the place. That is, an assault!

But with the assault, not everything is clear either. It began on April 20, 1945 (by the way, Hitler’s birthday), the artillery of the 1st Belorussian Front opened fire on the city center. After the war, our historians claimed that our guns dropped more explosives on the city than Allied heavy bombers. Zhukov writes: “11 thousand guns of different calibers opened simultaneous fire at certain intervals. From April 21 to May 2, one million eight hundred thousand artillery shots were fired at Berlin. In total, more than 36 thousand tons of metal were rained down on enemy defenses in the city.”

The Germans did not have a single chance to defend the capital of the Reich. The garrison of the city at this time consisted of approximately 45,000 soldiers from scattered, battered units and approximately 40,000 of all sorts of rabble from the Volkssturm, police, and so on. The main force of the garrison was considered to be the LVI Corps of General Weidling: Panzer Division "Munchenberg" (formed on March 8, 1945!), 9th Parachute Division, 18th and 20th Panzer Grenadiers, 11th SS Panzer " Norland" and the 503rd heavy tank battalion. Everything would be great if at least one of these divisions had more than 400 soldiers. By the way, it was the first two divisions that defended the Seelow Heights, so their condition is not at all difficult to imagine.

Well, purely for educational purposes, we will list others who had to save the capital of the Third Reich. French volunteer assault battalion "Charlemagne"; a naval battalion sent by Grand Admiral Doenitz; 15th Lithuanian fusilier battalion; 57th Fortress Regiment; 1st Anti-Aircraft Division "Berlin", Hitler's personal guard; the Hitler Youth regiment, hastily formed from Berlin boys and had nothing to do with the SS division of the same name. Oddly enough, Himmler’s personal guards were also stuck right there. That's all...

They were opposed by approximately one and a half million seasoned soldiers of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. For the first time, the Germans had every right to talk about the enemy’s tenfold superiority. There is probably no point in describing in detail the course of the battles for the city, since this has been done in several works

A. Isaev, although everyone preaches one simple truth: Berlin was taken by Zhukov, once again by Zhukov and again by Zhukov. And the rest were just present.

In reality, of course, everything was more complicated. Let's start with the fact that the race to Berlin did take place. As proof, I will cite two orders given two hours apart. Let the participants in the events speak for themselves, and the reader can draw his own conclusions.

BATTLE ORDER OF THE COMMANDER OF THE 1ST UKRAINIAN FRONT TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 3RD AND 4TH GUARDS TANK ARMIES ON THE NECESSITY TO ENTER BERLIN BEFORE THE TROOPS

1ST BELARUSIAN FRONT

Marshal Zhukov's troops are 10 km from the eastern outskirts of Berlin. I order you to be the first to break into Berlin tonight. Deliver the execution.

Krainyukov

RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 359. L. 36. Original.

BATTLE ORDER FROM THE COMMANDER OF THE 1ST BELARUSIAN FRONT TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 2ND GUARDS TANK ARMY WITH THE DEMAND TO BE THE FIRST TO BREAK INTO BERLIN

The 2nd Guards Tank Army is entrusted with the historical task of being the first to break into Berlin and hoist the Victory Banner. I personally instruct you to organize the execution.

Send one of the best brigades from each corps to Berlin and give them the task: no later than 4 o’clock in the morning on April 21, 1945, to break through to the outskirts of Berlin at any cost and immediately report to Comrade Stalin and advertise in the press.

RF. F. 233. Op. 2307. D. 193. L. 88. Original.

Moreover, note that Zhukov perfectly understands the importance of the report “on the authorities” and newspaper PR. It is interesting that General Lelyushenko in his memoirs slightly corrected Konev’s order, cutting out the word “first” from it, or the editors did it for him.

Meanwhile, the fever of changing commanders could not stop in the German command. On April 22, Hitler removes General Reimann, replacing him with Colonel Ernst Koether, promoting him first to major general and then to lieutenant general in one day. On the same day, he gives the order to shoot the commander of the LVI tank corps, General Weidling, who failed to hold the line of defense on the Oder, and immediately cancels his order. After this, the Fuhrer decides to personally take command of the Berlin garrison, and then appoints Weidling to this position. This series of events clearly shows that the Fuhrer's headquarters has simply turned into a madhouse. Despite the complexity of the situation at the height of the battle for Moscow, with the panic that arose in the Soviet capital (it happened, it happened!), our command did not reach such insanity.

Weidding divided the city into eight defensive sectors to make the defense easier to manage. However, nothing could stop the Soviet troops. On April 23, Chuikov's 8th Guards Army crossed the Spree and, with the support of General Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army, began to advance in the direction of Neukölln. On April 24, General Berzarin's 5th Shock Army also crossed the Spree in the Treptower Park area. The remnants of the LVI Panzer Corps, still partly commanded by Weidling, attempted to counterattack but were simply destroyed. On the same day, after a powerful artillery barrage - 650 guns per kilometer! Never before in history has such a density of artillery been seen! - Soviet troops launched a decisive offensive. By evening Treptower Park was busy.